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Mhis  paper  - a product of the Public Sector Management  and Private Sector Development  Division,
Country Economics  Department  - reflects an early application  of a methodology  for private sector
assessment  developed  by the Divisic ' to identify  constraints  on, and priorities  for, the development  of a
country's  private  sector. Copies  of +  paper  are available  free from the World  Bank, 1818  H Street  NW,
Washington,  DC  20433.  Please  contact  Priscilla  Infante,  room  N9-059,  extension  37642  (November  1992,
48 pages).
Private sector  assessments  provide  information  economy.  Informal  firms  pay some taxes,  but
and analysis  essential  to formulating  strategies  there is considerable  leakage  in collection.
for alleviating  constraints  on private  sector
development.  They are meant to contribute  both  Unnecessary  rigidities  in labor  policies
to the Bank's policy dialogue  with borrowing  weigh less heavily  than expected  on firms,
govenmments  and to the formulation  of country  because  they  avoid their full costs through such
assistance  strategies.  means  as subcontracting  and apprenticeships.
The restrictions  nonetheless  limit firms' flexibil-
Rueda-Sabater  and Stone examine  the  ity of operation  and ability  to reward merit.
constraints  on growth faced  by private  enter-
prises and how these relate  to the policy and  In the 1980s,  public spending  increasingly
institutional  environment  in C6te d'Ivoire. They  channeled  limited financial  resources  and human
employ  new data sources  as well as surveys  of,  capital  toward  nondevelopment  purposes,
and in-depth  interviews  with, private  entrepre-  including  poorly performing  enterprises  and
neurs. They  focus on:  elite-oriented  services,  precluding  their  use in the
private  sector.  The methods  of financing  public
o  The effects  of taxes and labor  regulation  on  spending  (such as withholding  taxes and accu-
private firms.  mulating  arrears)  have sharply  curtailed  the
capital available  to private enterprises.  The
The impact  of public  spending  on private  public sector's  dramatic  accumulation  of arrears
sector  development.  and growing  reputation  as a bad customer  are
undermining  the competitive  private supply  of
o  The role  of informality  in enterprise  activity.  goods  and services  to the government.
Among  their findings:  Government  employment  policies attract
many  of the most qualified  potential  entrepre-
Tax policy and enforcement  impose  a heavy  neurs and business  professionals  to government
financial  burden  on a shrinking  base of formal  employment.
enterprises,  whose regulatory  burden  has also
grown.  Taxes are increasingly  independent  of a  Rather  than a sharp  divide, there is a con-
firm's profits. This substantial  fixed  cost may  tinuum  between  small informal  and large formal
lead some businesses  to exit prematurely  and  firms. Some medium-size  and large formal firms
may discourage  others from formal  entry.  The  engage  in informal  behavior,  and large firms
overall  tax burden  on small and medium-size  sometimes  lower  their costs through links with
enterprises  has risen disproportionately,  to levels  informal  firms  - including  purchases  of inputs
that discourage  formal  participation  in the  that have escaped  regulation  and taxes.
The Policy ResearchWorking  PaperSeriesdisseminates  thefindings  of work  under  way in theBank.  Anobjectiveof the series
is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations  are less than fully polished. The findings, interpretations, and
conclusions in these papers  do not necessarily  represent  official Bank policy.
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This  paper reflects  an early  application  of a methodology  for private  sector  assessment  [PSA]
developed  by CECPS' to identify  constraints  to and priorities  for the development  of a country's
private  sector. PSAs  provide  information  and analysis  essential  to formulating  strategies  to alleviate
constraints  to private  sector development  (PSD). They  are intended  to contribute  both to the policy
dialogue  with  borrowing  governments  and to the formulation  of country  assistance  strategies. They
are not strategies  themselves,  but rather  Generally,  PSAs  include:  (i) an analytic  description  of the
private  sector and its role in the economy; (ii) a discussion  of policy,  institutional  and other factors
that limit efficient private sector economic  activity;  and (iii) identification  of priority areas for
government  actions  and World  Bank Group assistance.
Specifically,  two steps are recommended  at the outset of a PSA to determine  its focus:
First, collect and review  existing  knowledge  about the private sector by reviewing
documents  and talking  with operational  staff.  In the process,  learn what experts
currently  understand  to be the priorities  for promoting  PSD.
*  Second,  identify  gaps  in knowledge  on key  issues  and on the role and structure  of the
private  sector.
In this case,  consultation  with Bank  staff  in Washington  and in Abidjan  revealed  a particular  concern
with  the stagnation  of urban  enterprise,  and a desire  for more  information  about  labor market  issues,
the informal  sector,  tax and  other regulatory  constraints,  and  the interaction  of public  investment  and
expenditure  policy  with private  sector development  [PSD]. Thus, we focused  our investigation  on
these four issues  - stead of conducting  a more sweeping  analysis  that might have scratched  the
surface  of a broader range of issues. While in C8te dlIvoire,  we consulted  informed  officials  and
other experts,  but most of our time and resources  were devoted to speaking  with entrepreneurs
themselves: individuals  whose day to day confrontation  of their country's  economic,  physical  and
institutional  constraints  makes them an invaluable  source of information  on priorities for policy
reform. The study  made  use of both in-depth  interviews  with  businesses  and a firm-level  survey  that
elicited information  from 37 firms  of all types in Abidjan  and Bouake on problems  confronted,
emphasizing  constraints  to future growth  and operation.
Initial analysis  of the data revealed  that legal  status  provides  the best clue to the dominant
problems  of an Ivoirian  enterprise. Grouping  firms  by legal  status (rather than age, size,  or activity)
elicits  most clearly  the key  characteristics  of enterprises  and the problems  they face. Thus, a good
many  of the results  reported here are organized  by the legal  status of the firms  studied.
I  CECPS is the Public Sector Management  and Private  Sector Development  Division  of the
Country  Economics  Department  of the World  Bank
2FoDowing  the completion  of field  work  for this  study  in 1990,  CECPS  has continued  to refine
its field  surveys,  in terms of both the survey  instruments  tnemselves  and their design  and analysis.
Nonetheless,  the current study demonstrates  the power of this type of survey  to generate policy-
relevant  information.  This  is perhaps  best exemplified  in the study  by  the startlingly  high  importance
firms place on  the obstacle imposed by tax regulation compared to labor regulation:  in the
institutional  environment  of CMte  d'Ivoire,  apparently  restrictive  labor  law  is avoidable,  while  imposing
tax requirements  are not.
Finally,  since  this sticly  and other studies  on competitiveness  and the regulatory  framework
were carried  out in 1990,  a number  of policy  changes  have  been agreed  to by the government  of CMte
d'Ivoire  aimed  at easing  constraints  to the private  sector. These measures  include:  competitiveness-
oriented reform  of labor regulation  (including  hiring,  firing  and overtime  regulations);  reduction  of
taxes  on labor, profits and commercial  transactions;  commitment  to a program  of divestiture  of a
number  of state-owned  enterprises,  endorsement  of a human resources  development  plan moving
public  expenditure  away  from  elite-oriented  services  towards  more  socially  productive  and equitable
ends;  and financial  sector reform.
3L ENRODUCTON
CMte  dlvoire's economic  tale of the last two decades  is starkly  reflected  in the collapse  of
private investment  in the 1980s. During  the 1970s  private investment  had fluctuated  moderately
around 14%  of GDP (a level  higher  that the SubSaharan  African  average,  see table 1),  while  GDP
was  growing  at a healthy  6% annual  average  (with  significant,  crop-driven  f'tictuations).  Public  sector
investment  soared from 7% of GDP in 1971-2  to 13%  of GDP in 1978-9,  reflecting  sharp  growth  in
earnings  from the countq's main export commodities  during most of this period. Since the early
1980s,  though, both gross investment  and the private sector's share of it (see Table I) have
plummeted,  even by Sub-Saharan  African  standards,  to about 3% of GDP.
This dramatic  decline  of private  investment  (to levels  well  below  what would  be necessary
even to  replace of worn-out plant) reflected both a worsening  economic  environment  and the
powerful  crowding  out effect of a public  sector which had failed to respond to macroeconomic
change. The worsening  economic  environment  was  plainly  visible  in the contraction  of demand  for
all Idnds  of goods  and services.  One clear sign  of the public  sector's  negative  impact  on the economy
has been the drying  up of bank finance  for private  investment.
Table 1: PublIc,  Private  and Total Investment  In Cote d'Ivofe
(in Percentage  Points  of Nominal  GDP)
Sector  /  Year  1975  1976  1977  197  1979  j980 a1981  1982  1983  1964  1985  1986  1987  1988
Private  Sector  13.2  13.6  16.6  16.4  14.7  14.7  15.8  11.1  9.8  4.0  3.6  1.7  2.9  4.5
Publfc  Sector  9.2  9.4  10.8  13.3  13.3  13.6  10.2  23.1  10.8  6.9  9.0  9.3  10.1  10.0
Total  Inv.  CDI  22.4  23.0  27.3  29.8  28.0  28.2  25.9  23.2  20.6  10.9  12.6  11.1  13.1  14.5
Total  Inv.  Sm  23.4  22.9  22.7  23.3  22.1  23.1  22.4  22.5  18.2  17.2  18.5  18.7  18.4  18.2
Total  Inv.  OECD  24.6  24.5  24.5  23.4  24.2  24.4  23.1  22.5  [20.8  21.5  21.1  21.3 121.9  22.8
Note:  SS  a  Sub-Saharan  African  Countries;  OECDo  High  incom  OECD  Countrfes
Source:  DEC  Analytical  Database
While  the accuracy  of aggregate  investment  figures  may  be questionable  (they  probably  miss
most of non-formal  private  investment),  there is no doubt about the significance  of the trend they
depict The information  from  macroeconomic  aggregates  is fully  consistent  with  enterprise-level  data
from both secondary 2 and primary'  sources. Together,  they show  the private  sector's  role as more
2  Banque  des Donn6es Fmnancieres  (BDF) data show,  for instance,  that the average  enterprise
in C8te dlIvoire became decapitalized,  by about 4% in nominal  terms, between 1982 and 1988.
Privileged  access  to resources  by public  enterprises,  though,  postponed  their  day of reckoning  while
it accelerated  the crisis  of large private  enterprises  - which  faced  a  dramatic  disinvestment  process:
4of a dependent (farmers excepted)  than a partner in economic  growth. Thus, w:ien the public
sector's resources  started to dry up, much  of the private sector went into a sharp decline. Public
policy  limited  the flexbility  with which  private  firms  could  react to changing  circumstances,  making
the decline  almost  irreversible.
In this context one must underswre the impact  of the real rate of exchange',  which has
helped to reduce the competitiveness  of exports and encourage  an inward-orientation  among  the
majority  of private  enterprises. Most  enterprises  now  struggle  to find  markets  for their production
in  the  face of a  shrinking overali domestic market.  The efficacy  of protection of domestic
manufacturing  is declining:  every  increase  in import  duties  (to generate  revenues  and to compensate
for the real appreciation  of the currency)  appears to reduce actual protection  by enhancing  the
incentives  for smuggling.
Public  expenditure  (through  both agencies  and parastatals) 5 has always  had powerful  inApacts
on private enterprise, both positive and negative. Over the last decade, the effects of public
expenditure  and the need to finance  tremendous  fiscal  deficits  have tumed sharply  negative. While
expenditure  in the 1970s  arguably  supported  and-encouraged  private  investment,  in the 1980s  public
expenditure  has increasingly  channeled  limited  financial  resources  and human  capital  towards  uses
that served  neither development  nor poverty  allevistion,  precluding  their potentially  more efficient
use in  the  private sector.  Government's financing  methods (such as forfeiture taxes and
accumulation  of domestic  arrears)  have  further  curtailed  the capital  available  to private  enterprises.
Furthermore,  the government  has denied the private sector open, competitive  access to up- and
downstream  linkages  with public  enterprises. Finally,  it has prohibited  competition  with parastatals,
further limiting  potential  private  investment.
The "creativity'  of tax authorities  has become  a serious  threat to business. Among  the most
egregious  recent  outcomes:  export premia  are counted  as income  when they  are due (not when  they
are paid) and thus subject  to profit taxes,  often in advance  of their actual receipt  by exporters;  and
the latest tax (a 5% withholding  tax  on gross  sales)  is at best a tax pre-payment  measure  in times  of
tight  liquidity  and at its worst  an inflationary  surcharge. Not  surprisingly,  the CECPS  survey  showed
19%  in nominal  terms  and between 1982  and 1988.
3  The CECPS  mission  of June 1990  surveyed  38 private  SMEs (the sample  was not randomly
selected  but it appears  to be reasonably  representative),  and interviewed  a dozen larger enterprises
and a number  of microentrepreneurs.  Obviously,  few  of the conclusions  derived  from the survey  and
interviews  have  their basis  in statistical  inference.
4.  The real exchange  rate is often measured  by  multiplying  the nominal  exchange  rate by the ratio
of foreign  to domestic  prices (although  technically  it should  be multiplied  by the ratio of the prices
of tradable  to nontradables  goods). It is  thus a critical  determinant  of the competitiveness  of exports
in international  markets  and that of imports  in domestic  markets.
5  In 1988,  current expenditure  totalled  about 33% of GDP.
5that taxes  were perceived  by all types  of enterprises  as a threat to their survival  and as the leading
obstacle  to expanding  their activities.
Rigidities  in labor  regulations  sr  also a significant  concern. This is not so much  because  of
what they imply  for the cost structure  ot enterprises  -- labor costs  are considered  a relatively  minor
constraint  by  most  entrepreneurs  - bvt rather because  the regulatory  system  tends  to favor  enterprise
shut-downs  over  enterprise  restructuring  by,  inter  alia,  making  selective  employment  reductions  much
more difficult than massive,  across-the-board  ones.  In  addition, there may be dire dynamic
consequences  of restrictions  on performance  incentives  for productive  efficiency.
An intricate  web of import  protection  and concessions  completes  the picture and provides  a
large part of the explanation  for the exorbitantly  high cost of many  intermediate  imported  inputs.
Such  a system  depends  both on anti-.ompetitive  regulations  and on similarly  uncompetitive  policies
in neighboring  countries. As some  neighbors  have  increased  their competitiveness,  the system  has
eroded,  r.aking the much  of "modern"  Ivoirian  industry  unsustainable.
6II. TAXONOMY  OF THE PRIVAATE  SECTOR'
The non-farming  Private  sector  in Cote  d'Ivoire  consists  of:  about  800  "large"  enterprises  (with
at least .50  employees);  several  thousand  "medium"  enterprises  (with  between 10  and 50 employees);
many thousands  of Ismall"  enterprises  (with up to 10 employees);  and several hundred  thousand
microentrepreneurs  (mostly  just generating  self-employment).  Total employment  in the private
enterprise  sector is roughly  divided  as follows:  large 10o, medium  and small  15%, and micro 75%7
This "pyramid"  of enterprise types  has at its top twenty  very large public  enterprises  employing  an
average  of 1,400  people each. The pyram-id  is also quite rugged  -- with a very marked  shortage  of
small  and medium  enterprises  poised  for growth.
Essentially  all large enterprises  and a small  group of medium  enterprises  appear to rcceive
the bulk of the benefits  of "formality"  (bank  financing,  investmen't  incentives,  etc.) and, in exchange,
face  the greatest  rigidities  and collect  the bulk  of the indirect  taxes. A very large  proportion  of the
"medium"  size enterprises  are not in manufacturing  and would  seem to be very vulnerable  to the
adjustment  Cote d'Ivoire's  economy  is,  belatedly,  undergoing.  These  enterprises  represent  the lower
end of the scale  of an artificially  modem  (i.e. uncompetitive)  sector  and have  been the first to suffer
the impact  of the current crisis. Because  many  of these are owned  and run by expatriates  they are
also  less  resilient. Meanwhile,  the indigenous  entrepreneurs  (other than the privileged  larger ones)
have found it extremely  difficult  to obtain  the resources  to grow  from a very  small  size  -- stunted  by
a regulatory  and financial  system  that has been private  sector oriented  only  in a very  narrow,  large-
biased sense.
Large  private  enterprises  employ  an average  of 145  people  each  and represent  a varied  group
including  subsidiaries  of multinational  corporations,  joint private-public  ventures  (with  state minority
shareholding),  enterprises  owned  by Ivoirian  nationals,  and those  owned  by other nationals  (mostly
French and Lebanese). The nationality  mix of the owners and managers  of these large private
enterprises is reflected  in the fact that nearly one-fifth  of payroll expenditure  in 1988 was for
6  The classification  of enterprises  by size follows  the practice  of the Ivorian  Ministry  of Industry,
which incorporates a relatively  low threshold for classifying  enterprises as "large":  50 or more
employees.  The information  on which  the analysis  in this  section  is based  comes  from  the following
sources:  'Banque des Donnees  Financi&es"  (1988);  SME Survey  by Centre Gama (1989);  Informal
Sector  Survey  by  Centre Gama (1988);  and by  the survey  and interviews  conducted  by  the June 1990
CECPS  mission.  Our access  to microentrepreneurs  in Bouake  was  greatly  facilitated  by M. Maurice
Djan of OIC International.
7 These  figures  are rough,  illustrative  estimates  based  on a variety  of sources. Data for the nearly
800  large  private  enterprises  show  total employment  of about 120,000.  Medium  and small  enterprise
employment  is estimated  - with a wide margin  of error - to approach  200,000. According  to A.
Tour6, an authoritative  observer  of the informal  sector, there are over one million  people  working
in Cote d'Ivoire's urban informal  sector.  His definition  ("petit metiers")  is broader than that of
microenterprises  employed  here (activities  involving  some  specialization  and continuity).
7expatriate  employees  (who represent 3% of their labor force). Mostly  oriented to the domestic
market,  these nearly  800  enterprises  account  for over  20%  of GDP and of tax revenues,  and  for more
than half of all corporate income  taxes. They form  the hard-core  modem  sector and represent  the
only  significant  part of the economy  where the basis  exists  for a reasonable  implementation  of the
VAT  system 8.
Large enterprises  are generally  registered  as corporations  and comply  with tax regulations
(including  the workers'  social  security,  the CNPS,  which  appears  to be the most frequently  evaded
form  of taxation).  This  does not necessarily  mean that their tax  burden is higher  since  they  also  have
the bookkeeping  and negotiating  capacity  needed to obtain  exemptions  and allowances  from the tax
authorities. Between  1982  and 1988,  for instance, gross  value  added  among  large  private  enterprises
grew  only  by about 13% (compared  to accumulated  inflation  for that six-year  period of about 25%)
and their total tax bill  by more  sizeable  28%. Weakening  demand  compounds  the pressure  resulting
from a growing  tax  burden (22%  of gross  value  added  in 1988,  compared  to 19%  in 1982  for the large
enterprises)  and resulted  not only in the decapitalization  noted above,  but also in a 24% reduction
in total employment  by large  private  enterprises  (from  a 1982  average  of 190  workers  to a 1988  one
of 145)  -- just about sufficient  to keep total payroll  expenditures  constant  in nominal  terms.
Bracing  for the lean  years  ahead,  large  private  enterprises  have  reduced  their  stock  of medium
and long-term  debt (with  which  they were highly  leveraged)  by 18%  between 1982  and 1988. Tne
balance  between long and short-teim  debt worsened  -- most Ukely  not by choice but because of
increasingly  difficult  access  to long term funds. Meanwhile,  public  enterprises  increased  their stock
of long-term  debt by 23%. Private  enterprises  have not managed  to reduce  their reliance  on short-
term debt, given  that new tax withholding  measures  and mounting  public  sector receivable  arrears
have significantly  increased  liquidity  pressures  on enterprises  by forcing  upon them additional  parts
of the deficit financing  burden.
Until  recently,  many9  large  private  enterprises  had suffered  relatively  little from  the economic
crisis  that plagues  the country. Their privileged  access  to resources,  their public  sector  connections,
and their protection  from  external  and  internal  competition  had  buffered  them. The deepening  fiscal
and financial  crisis,  the collapse  of domestic  demand,  and the growth  of uncontrollable  competition
are now  seriously  menacing  most  of them. While  there is no avoiding  the adjustment  ahead for the
large  enterprise sector, its impact  on the economy  (and on the enterprises  themselves)  will  depend
significantly  on the role regulatory  rigidities  play  in the adjustment  process.
8  It would  be wrong,  though to conclude  that they are the most heavily  taxed because  they
collect  the bulk of the VAT receipts. Where the burden of the VAT falls  depends  on the factors
behind  demand and supply  elasticities.
'  Textile manufacturers  being one of the most notable exceptions. Production  of the most
popular  textile  items  is at less  than half (in physical  terms)  the ! 985  level  due to the combined  effect
of illegal  imports  and reduced demand.
8The distribution  channels  (for final  products)  which  used to be controlled  at the wholesale
level  by  large,  formal  enterprises  with  heavy  overheads  (reflecting  comfortably  protected  margins)  now
largely  depend on aggressive  smaller  wholesalers  of a less  tractable  nature. These lean,  competitive
traders  (a majority  of them Lebanese)  are gradually  replacing  the large  colonial  trading  houses  (now
left with at most one-third  of the total wholesale  market). The much maligned  Lebanese traders
could be considered  an economic  asset: they  serve the consumer  well  and have  probably  reduced
distribution  margins  significantly  from the prior ones.  Nevertheless,  it is a less  controllable  system
which  does not keep complete  accounting  records  and is prepared  to tap into irregular  sources  of
supply  when they offer favorable  terms -- thus  evading  the prevailing  distortions  and rigidities.
This evolution  of the distribution  system  for domestic  manufactures  and imports  is  symp-
tomatic  of the erosion  of a partnership  between  the state and large  enterprises  which  for two  decades
extracted  considerable consumer  surplus  (increasing  the cost of living)  and created an artificially
modern  system.  The central  government's  tax  structure  was  designed  with  this  modern  system  in mind
and is unlikely  to be well-suited  to the post-adjustment  private enterprise  sector.
Small and medium  scale enterprises  (SMEs)  are a particularly  interesting  subject  of study
because of the key role their flexibility  equips  them to play in resource  reallocation  processes,  in
pur lit of efficiency. In CBte  d'Ivoire,  SMIEs  fall into two fairly  distinct  categories  which  are not
separated  so much  by size  as by  enterprise  culture. At one end of the spectrum  are fully  documented
corporations  and unincorporated  limited liability  enterprises (ULLEs) and at the other are sole
proprietorships  which  keep few records.
The present situation  is particularly  bleak for the smaller  enterprises  attempting  to comply
with all legal requirements. The characteristics  of corporate  SMEs  are reasonably  well-known,  on
the basis  of the records  submitted  by over 1,500  of them to the Government  (see table 2). They  are
a rapidly  declining  breed' 0 that in 1988  employed  22% fewer  people  than in 1982  and that, over that
six-year  period,  has seen:
(i)  turnover and operating  margins  decline  (in nominal  terms,  the value added of the average
enterprise  dropped  by 19%  but payroli  costs  were only 12%  lower);  and
(ii)  tax burdens  increase  in both relative  (from 16%  of value added to 27%) and absolute  terms
(although SME's value added was 27% lower in 1988 than in 1982, they contributed 19%O
more to the public  coffers).
10  Between  1982  and 1988  their total number  declined  by over 10%,  with 173  enterprises  either
dropping  out of sight (becoming  informal  operations)  or (most  likely)  just closing  down.
9Table 2:  Formal  Enterprises: Evolution  1982-1988
Large  Large  Private
.. .....  .::.__  ........  Pubtic  Private  SNEs
tC50  emp]
Change  in  Numbers  -41X  0  105
(No.  In  1988)  (20)  (762)  (1,510)
Change  in  Avg. Vatue Added
per  Enterprise  *  13X  -19X
Change  In  Totat  Enptoyment  -18X  -24X  -22X
(Avg. eWployment  in  1988,
per  enterprise  (1,400)  (145)  (9)
(Totat  Employment,  1988)  (28,006) (110,565) (13,713)
Tax  Burden/Value  Added:
in  1982  0.16  0.19  0.16
in  1988  0.20  0.22  0.27
Change  in  NLT Debt  23X  -18X  -23X
Change  in  Total  Expatriate  {
Employment  *  -40X  -44
(expatriate  employment  in  1988)  (140)  (3,206)  (1467)
(expatriate  payroll/total  payroll,
1988)  (3K)  (19K)  (32X)
SOURCE:  0  F/CECPS  b  Not meaningful
Mote:  Large enterprises  are  those  with  50  or  more  enployees.
Another significant  characteristic  of these smaller  corporations  and ULLEs is the large
proportion of them that is owned and/or managed  by expatriates. A rece-nt  survey"  found that
nearly  half were owned  by non-African  expatriatesu,  and a further third by non-Ivoirian  Africans.
Eleven  percent of employee=  were expatriates  who  account  for 32% of aUl  payroll  costs (in spite of
a significant  reduction  from  an astonishing  15%  of employees  who  were expatriates  in 1982).  In view
of their close external connections,  it is a remarkable  indication  of anti-export  distortions  in the
economy  that only one-eighth  of these enterprises  have had any  exporting  experience  and that not
a single  one is primarily  engaged  in exports.
Gama Centre, 1989.
1 Of the non-African  expatriates  one-third  were French  and  two-thirds  other nationalities  (mostly
Lebanese). Less than half of the French-owned  enterprises,  compared to three-quarters  of the
others, intended  to expand.
10SME  owner/managers,  regardless  of nationality,  are well-educated:  all of the respondents  to
the survey  had at least secondary  education,  and a majority  of the expatriates  had higher  education.
Education  emerges  as an important  determinant  of "formality":  it is the enterprises  with the more
educated  owners/managers  that are registered  as corporations  or ULLEs,  pay  the full  range of taxes,
and in turn benefit from bank financing  and technical  assistance.
SMEs  which  are registered  as sole proprietorships  (or unregistered)  are much  more  likely  to
be owned  by Ivoirian  and other African  nationals. Their owners  are less  educated,  they tend to
employ fewer people, they rely much more on apprentices,  and they seldom receive technical
assistance  or Bank  financing.  It is particularly  ironic  that there is such  a clear relationship  between
education  and technical  assistance:  the needier  the SMEs  (because  of the low  level of education  of
their principals),  the less  likely  they  are to be the recipients  of technical  assistance.
The larger,  more  formal  SMEs  seem  to be facing  considerable  difficulties  and, in many  cases,
their very  existence  will  be threatened by the adjustment  process. On the other hand, the smaller,
indigenously  owned/managed  SMEs  are accustomed  to facing  obstacles  and to having  their growth
stunted;  they are bound  to be much  more  resilient  and could more  easily  respond  to a less  rigid  and
distorted  environment.
Microenterprises.  An extensive  recent survey' provides  reliable,  basic  information  on urban
and  peri-urban  microenterprises.  This  survey  depicts  a complex  and  varied  sector  (see table 3) which
ranges from embryonic  SMEs  in the manufacturing  sector (22% of the enterprises)  and industrial
support  services  (20% are repair  workshops  of ali kinds)  to the more  stereotypical  vendors  (29% of
the enterprises).
There are clear specializations  by gender,  with females  much  more likely  to be involved  in
vending  and food-related  activities,  and males  much more likely  to be involved  in services  and in
those  manufacturing  activities  where  sales  most  often take place  at the point of production.  For the
majority  of microentrepreneurs  (male  and female  alike,  although  by a lower  margin  for the latter),
their activity  constitute  the main  source  of household  income.
The large  majority  of microenterprises  are not formally  registered  - which  is probably  related
to the low  level of education  of their owners  (table 4). Only 14%  of the microentrepreneurs  have
a secondary  education,  while  48% declared  themselves  to be illiterate. Illiteracy  is more common
among  females (53%) than among  males (46%), and among non-Ivoirians  (52%) than among
Ivoirians  (44%).
'  Gama Centre, 1988. Mssrs.  Guibony  Sinsin  and Zilma Badiel  were instrumental  in gathering
and processing  this unique data source. The survey  systematically  sampled  several  urban and peri-
urban areas in Abidjan and its vicinity  and obtained information  on  1,588 microentrepreneurs
involved  in 55 different  types  of activities.  We have  classified  these  55 activities  into five  sub-sectors:
commerce; other services (ranging from typists to  hairdressers);  bars and restaurants; repair
workshops;  food processing;  and other manufacturing.
11TABLE  3:  Microenterprises
Average Aniuat
No.  of  No.  of  Distribution  Turnover
Subsector  Different  Activities  Enterprises of  Enterp.ises  (USS'OOO)
Commerce  16  466  29_  7.4
Bars/Restaurants  3  91  6X  5.4
Other  Services  12  358  23X  6.6
Workshops  11  318  20X  N.A.
Food  Processing  7  161  10X  7.4
Other  Manufacturing  6  194  12X  22.7
6 Subsector Total  55  1,588  100X  9-4
SOURCE: GANA  Center/CECPS
Note:  All  data  appties  to  the  sample in  the  CANA  survey,  which is  not  a census of  all  firms.
Virtually all microentrepreneurs  report paying taxes (although the survey data do not
illuminate  exactly  what type of taxes  they pay). Those  with activities  requiring  fixed  premises  most
often reporting payment of ficensing  taxes.  Their annual turnover averages over US $9,000
equivalent,  while  their costs  average  close  to 50%  of tumover. Net incomes  (which  vary  more with
activity  than with education,  gender,  or nationality)  appear,  on average,  to be above  the level  cf the
minimum  wage  (SMIG).
TABLE  4:  Microentrepreneurs
Percent  Secondry/  I
of  Saptle  Illiterate  Primary  Nigher  Total
Ivoirian  Female  (21)  52X  33X  15X  100l
Other  Female  (7)  43X  43X  14X  100X
Ivoirian  Male  (31)  36X  392  23X  1001
Other  Male  (42)  521  30X  10X  100X
All  Hicroentrepreneurs (100)  482  38X  14X  1001
Source:  GANA  Center/CECPS
12M. FORMALITY. INFORMALITY AND PSD CONSIRAINTS
Classifying  private  enterprises  according  to their form  of registration  provides  a clear  picture
of Cote d'Ivoire's  formality-informality  continuum.  The CECPS  private  enterprise  survey,  conducted
among 37 firms" 4 in Abidjan and Bouake, illuminates  both firm characteristics  and respondents'
perceptions  of the binding  constraints  to their growth  and future operation. On one extreme  are
foreign-owned  corporations  paying  a wide array of taxes and complying  with burdensome  labor
regulations. On the other extreme  are unregistered  microenterprises  paying  rudimentary  taxes and
escaping  much  of the burden  of labor  regulations.  The former  benefit  from access  to bank financing
and legal  recourse,  as well  as from  investment  incentives  and other government-sponsored  assistance
programs. The latter fend for themselves,  subject  to considerable  arbitrariness  in their exposure  to
revenue-raising  from government  representatives.  Informality  emerges  not as the deliberate  choice
of entrepreneurs  but as their response  to a tax and regulatory  system  that assumes  away  the realities
of the large  majority  of the existing  enterprises  -- as reflected,  for instance,  in the unrealistic  record-
keeping requirements  of the VAT and in the biases (favoring  large enterprises)  of the incentive
structure.  While informal status  characterizes only rather small enterprises, informal behaviors are
engaged  in by enterprises  of many  sizes.
Naturally,  the majority  of enterprises  fall in between  the two extremes  descnIbed  above --
paying  some  taxes  and managing  to capture some  of the benefits  of formality.  SMEs  cover  the full
spectrum  from informality  to formality (as indicated  by enterprise registration,  which  provides  the
clearest distinction  in firm characteristics).  Table 5 shows four indicators  which point very
consistently  to the utility  of registration  status in segmenting  the continuum  of SMEs: education,
bank financing,  taxation,  and employment  of apprentices.
Table  5:  SME Characteristics  by lTpe of Registration
I  Of Owners/Managers  Payng  |I  I
With  Secondary  or  Licensing  Receiving  Of Apprentices  in
Higher  Education  Tax  VAT  Bank  Loans  Total  EopLoyment
Unregistered  43  75  0  13  47
Soto  Proprietorships  58  85  46  36  34
ULLEs  100  90  90  70  17
Corporations  100  100  100  75  2
SOURCE:  CECPS  Survey
14  While 37 entrepreneurs  were administered  a structured  questionnaire,  many others were
interviewed  in depth in a less-structured  interview  format  for other parts of our analysis.
13Legal  Status and Education. There is a strong  apparent  correlation  between  education  and
formality. One manifestation  is that entrepreneurs  opting for the "higher"  forms of registration
(corporate and unlimited liability)  tend to  be more educated.  Interpreting this unsurprising
correlation in light of discussions  with a wide range of entrepreneurs leads to  the  following
explanation:  better educated  entrepreneurs  feel more  confident  in their relations  with Government
and other  super-institutions  and, thus, see  formality  as  a  beneficial option.  Less educated
entrepreneurs,  faced  with an arbitrary,  predatory  state feel forced  to retreat into relative  obscurity,
shunning  formal  obligations,  thus  forsaking  formal  sector  privileges  in the process. This  suggests  that
the intensive  involvement  of the state and the complexity  of its regulatory  interventions  make lack
of education  a more serious  obstacle  to growth  than it would  be otherwise.
Bank  financing.  As  an indicator  of the benefits  of formality,  the incidence  of bank loans  also
varies  significantly  by type  of enterprise  -- although  it is likely  to have  been overstated  in the survey
that was unavoidably  biased  towards  "accessible"  SMEs. The incidence  of bank lending  also  suggests
that the banking  system  in Cote d'Ivoire  (at least  in major urban  areas) has a relatively  broad reach
among  formal  enterprises. Nonetheless  the firms  identified  access  and cost of bank financing  as a
substantial  obstacle  to growth  (see below). This may  reflect two  factors: first, a "crowding  out" of
private  finance  by the need to finance massive  public  debt; and second,  a record of poor portfolio
management  and politically  influenced  loans  whose high default rates have dried up the current
supply of capital.  For international banks, the risk associated with political and macroeconomic
uncertainties  deters commitment  of new  capital.
The main  source of start-up financing  for all types  of enterprises  is savings,  closely  followed
by contributions from partners and relatives. There is, though, an apparent discontinuity  with respect
to project financing:  while virtually  none of the SMEs were able to rely on loans for initial financing,
one-sixth of the microentrepreneurs surveyed report having borrowed part of their start-up funds.
At the other end of the spectrum, more than a third of ULLEs and corporate SMEs received start-up
bank loans - a proportion that increases to over half in the case of foreign-owned SMEs. The most
likely explanation is that the larger, better  connected enterprises have preferential access to bank
financing, while microenterprises can tap the informal financial system for their limited needs, and
those in between fnd  it harder to interest formal lenders in their investment projects.
Taxation. Taxes are the favorite villain  of entrepreneurs in Cote d'Ivoire (a detailed analysis
is presented in chapter  MV).  Some taxes are paid by virtually every enterprise, but their relative
impact is not easily comparal.  Ie, due to inconsistent enforcement of tax law. Enforcement falls into
three different categories of assessments: based on well  defined parameters (e.g. accounting  profits);
calculated from proxies (e.g. lump-sum  estimates for VAT collections);  and determined arbitrarily  (e.g.
forfeitures and customs assessments).
Apprenticeship.  The  proportion of  apprentices in  an enterprise's  labor force is a  rich
indicator of formality.  Labor regulations (see chapter  V) appear daunting on paper yet, in our
survey, were not ranked high as an obstacle to growth by either SMEs or larger enterprises.  On the
one hand, corporations may have adjusted to labor rigidities  by increasing their capital/labor ratio; on
14the other hand, smaller  SMEs have had to resort to loopholes  such as an increasing  reliance on
apprenticeship.  In either case  the adjustment  appears  to have  been effective  enough to downgrade
labor costs and relations  as an obstacle  to grc  wth.
Obstacles to Gnowth
Overall  For the entire  sample,  lack  of access  to finance,  problems  of taxes,  and political  and
economic  uncertainty  weighed  most heavily  on respondents  (see Figure 1). It is interesting  to note
that high interest rates were rated a considerably  smaller  constraint  than access  to finance,  perhaps
reflecting credit rationing under controlled interest rates.  A number of the most interesting
conclusions  lie in the details  of these  aggregated  results,  broken  down  by firm  category.  For example,
finance  poses  an obstacle  for all groups  of enterprises,  although  corporations  are clearly  less  hindered
by it than other firms  (see Figure 2).  Not surprisingly,  the smallest  firms,  which  have  the greatest
trouble  obtaining  finance,  thus have  the least  complaint  about  the high  cost of finance  -- unregistered
firms  and sole proprietorships  regard  this as a lesser  obstacle  than ULLEs and corporations.
Taxes,  as discussed  below,  were difficult  both in their magnitude,  as the government  tried to
maintain  its revenue  from a shrinking  tax base,  and in terms  of their bureaucratic  requirements.  Not
surprisingly,  microenterprises  rated taxes  a much  smaller  constraints  than other firms. Uncertainty
about the country's  economic  and political  future made  investment  decisions  difficult,  underscoring
a pressing  need for credible  government  commitments  to political  and economic  reform. A number
of the most  interesting  conclusions  lie in the details  of these aggregated  results,  broken  down  by  firm
category.
TABLE  6:  Propertv  Rights  Problems  of Larger  Firms
Corporate  (Memo  item: Political/ Failure  Fraudulent Bureaucratic
Status  Average  Economic  of  Competition  Procedures
Employment) Uncertainty Justice
Unregistered  (6)  L  L  n.a.  L
(n-9)__  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _
Sole
Proprietorship  (12)  H  M  L  L
(n-14)  l
ULLE  (21)  H  H  H  M
(n-10)  l  .
Corporation  (77)  H  H  H  H
(n-4)  l
Key:  H - High obstacle;  M - Moderate  obstacle;  L  - Low  obstacle
Source:  CECPS  survey
15Flgure  2
Cote  d'lvoire: Obstacles  to Growth
(details  by  type  of registration  status)
Lack  access  to finance  I ................................  ......... .... . . . . . . . . . .
Taxes  .. . . .
Political/economic  uncertainty  .... _  . . ..  .. *.=
Not  enough  buyers  '
High  cost  of  finance  ........
Interruption  of  raw  materials  ............ .........................
~~~~~~~~.  ..  _ . . . .. . . . . .
High  cost  of  raw  materials  .................. I.;
Lack Information  on export  markets  ........
High  cost  of  equipment
Hostile  competition,  fraud  ~~
0
Not  an  obstacle maeral
obwob
Corporation  ULLE  DSoie  Proprietorship  II0  ther/None
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16Propertv rights and larger firms  The problems  particular to larger firms (ULLEs and
corporations)  are interesting  both for their immediate  effect and because  of what they  portend for
the growth  potential  of smaller,  less formal  enterprises. A major  concern appears  to be related  to
the security  of property  rights,  in the broadest  sense. Policy  uncertainty,  failure  of justice,  fraudulent
competition  (i.e. competition  by those not complying  with laws  and regulations),  and iureaucratic
procedures  cover  various  different  aspects  of the same problem: the failure  of public  institutions  to
generate, enforce and adjudicate  good law.'  Each of these emerged as a moderate to large
obstacle  for ULLEs and Corporations  in our sample. For contracts  to be reliable,  and income  from
investment  and productive  activity  dependable,  businesses  need a system  of consistent,  equitable,
understandable  laws  and regulations,  and the institutions  to assure  equal protection  under law,  and
its impartial  and speedy enforcement. Yet interview  data suggests  that access  to the formal  legal
system  is essentially  unavailable  to informal  firms  and that, within  the formal  sector, adjudication  is
neither speedy  nor impartial.
While  most  larger,  formal  enterprises  (corporations  and ULLEs)  report litigation  experience,
few  sole proprietorships  and unregistered  firms  have  been so involved. Once  engaged  in litigation,
the experience has been uniformly  frustrating,  with corporate litigation  requiring  many  years to
resolve  (an average  of four and a quarter in the CECPS  survey). This is bound to result in high
transaction costs and, thus, increase the  profitability  threshold for private investments  to  be
sustainable. Furthermore,  the system  of justice is regarded  as anything  but just. 1'  The combination
of unfairness  and slowness  has discouraged  many  entrepreneurs  from  the use of legal  recourse. This
weakens  the contracting  system,  forcing  businesses  to rely  less  on credit  and to deal  more  with  known
trading  partners. For new  entrants,  these conditions  can be extremely  restrictive  and the net effect
is likely  to be reduced competition -- and efficiency.
Fmally,  uncertainty  over the nation's  political  future and stability  of policy  appears  to most
as a significant  obstacle  to growth. The high  degree  of concern  with  political  uncertainty  is  common
to all registered  entrepreneurs;  unregistered  entrepreneurs  have  little to lose. Political  uncertainty
appears  to reflect  a perceived  worsening  and reduced  predictability  of the security  of property  rights.
Its negative  effect on the prospects  for private  sector development  cannot  be overemphasized.
Is One representative  of a trade association  descnrbed  public  regulation  in this  wayr "Regulation
is a machine  that lives  on its own  without  control  of the state. The chance  to live  when the cost of
living  is highest lies in having  power and monetizing  it.  The result is a system  of corrupt, bad
management.  The State goes  from being  the motor of development  to the brake of development.'
I  The fairness  of civil  suits  was  reportedly  largely  undermined  by payments  to court officials  or
jurists. One respondent  felt that the only  honest  judges  were those  who  were  independently  wealthy.
In many  cases,  one contracting  party  is able to avoid  enforcement  of contractual  obligations  by the
other party (hence payment  of debts)  by corrupting  the civil  legal  process.
18IV,  THE WIDE-RANGING  IMPACT  OF PUBLIC  EXPENDITURE  ON PSD:
CROWDING  IN AND OUT
Through  multiple  nexuses  of public/private  interaction,  public  spending  inevitably  influences
the characteristics  of the private  sector,  including  the opportunities  for entry,  growth  and  competitive-
ness  of private  enterprises.  Public  expenditure  is  often  discussed  in terms  of its specific  purposes  and
its aggregate  macroeconomic  consequences.  In addition,  recently,  it has become  common  to refer
to the impact  of any  specific  public  activity  on the private  sector as "crowding  out." This  implies  that
resources  utilized  by the government  are taken away  from the private sector and the functions  of
public  agencies  and officials  can be seen as activities  denied  to private  entrepreneurs. Yet, public-
private  interactions  are far more  complex  than  the simple,  zero-sum  game  implied  by  this  terminology,
and public  expenditure  to redress  market  failure  is a positive  sum  game." 7
In the case of C6te d'Ivoire,  public  expenditure  (and related  regulations  and fiscal  policies)
have  evolved  over time and have tended, recently,  to hinder private  sector development. Policies
designed  to assure that Ivoirians  fully  participate  in their country's  management  and wealth  were
weakened both by their design and by limitations  in the administrative  capacity  of the state.
Expenditure policy influences the  emergence of  the  private sector  in  two  broad ways:
macroeconomically,  it affects  the economic  stability  in which  firms  operate and the supply  of finance
available  to the private  sector; mnicroeconomically,  policies  associated  with  government  expenditures
have introduced  a variety  of distortions  and obstacles.
The impact  of public  expenditure  can be divided  into economy-wide  effects  and those that
are sector,  input or industry  specific.  Macroeconomic  considerations  include  the impact  of financing
government  expenditures,  and the impact  of the level of expenditures  themselves.' Government
borrowing  to finance  deficit  spending  is thought to exhaust  or drivs up the price of an inelastically
supplied  pool of credit, thus "crowding  out' otherwise  profitatle private borrowing. Conversely,
government  surpluses  create the potential  for "crowding  in"  investment  if the government's  savings
rate is higher than that of the private  sector. Public  expenditure  in Cote d'Ivoire  illustrates  clearly
both the positive  and negative  impacts.
The microeconomy  of public  expenditure  focuses  attention  on its impact  on individual  sectors
and factors  of production. Expenditure  policy  and related  regulation  affect  the path and pattern of
private sector development:  where the private  sector is free to develop,  where it is encouraged  to
17 Thus complementarities  between this kind of public  spending  and private  investment  can be
descnrbed  as "crowding  in."
I  While  many  economists  agree that public  deficits  can "crowd  out private  investment,  there is
an ongoing  debate  in the literature  over  the mechanism  through  which  this  occurs: some  believe  that
any deficit ultimately  crowds  out an equal amount of private borrowing,  while  others believe  the
means  of financing  the deficit  is critical  - that taxation  and public  borrowing  have  different  affects.
19develop,  and where  it is impeded  from  development.  Government  spending  decisions  affect  not only
the opportunity  for new PSD but also the cost of inputs and transactions  to existing  enterprises.
Further, in Cote d'Ivoire, the government  role in the economy  has left it with revenue flows  and
economic  interests (such  as those of public  enterprises,  see below)  that it actively  protects,  often at
the expense  of private  enterprises.
For nearly  two  decades  after independence,  the Government  of CMte  d'Ivoire  (GCI)  provided
one of the most welcoming  policy  environments  for private enterprise in West Africa,  attracting
enormous  foreign investment  and bringing  the benefits of rapid economic  growth to its citizens.
Government investment  in infrastructure,  education and health services  have in many respects
improved  opportunities  for private investment. It could even be argued that, up to a point, the
government's  commodity  price  stabilization  policies  schemes  effectively  mitigated  the adverse  effects
on farmers  of declines  in coffee  and cocoa prices  and improved  productive  efficiency  in the sector.
On the other hand,  where government  takes on activities  which  private  enterprise  is better
able to perform  (which  may  include  the provision  of publicly  financed  goods),  it may  reduce  social
welfare. Furthermore,  where  resources  for private  activity  are scarce  or where  government  financing
of its activities  is expensive,  a dollar of government  expenditure  can cost more than a dollar in
foregone private  activity. In these cases,  an argument  may  be made for the reduction  in scope  of
government  activities  in favor  of imperfect  private  markets.
In Cote d'Ivoire,  the general  burden  of deficit  spending  and the specific  burden of inefficient
public investments  and government  monopolies  have rightly brought into sharp question the
contribution  of government  spending- both its composition  and  overall  level  -- to development.  The
relatively  low  cost of foreign  goods  compared  to domestic  goods  has compounded  this imbalance.
This,  in turn, has resulted  in a loss  of competitiveness  and has led to contracLionary  policies  of a kind
particularly  damaging  to the private  sector - and to long term development.
Government  Expenditure  - Crowding  In:  In the CMte  d'Ivoire's  heyday,  the first eighteen
years  of independence,  it can be plausibly  argued  that public  investment  and its financing  "crowded
in"  private  investment  in two  ways.  First,  the government  was able  to finance  its deficit  by  borrowing
abroad instead of depleting  domestic  savings,  expanding  the total pool of money  and hence the
amount of money  available  for private investment.' 9 Second,  by undertaking  projects (e.g. infra-
structure  development)  complementaru  to private  sector  activity,  it encouraged  private  investment  to
grow  alongside  with public  investment.  Whether  or not this  argument  is valid,  however,  the situation
I  "...foreign  borrowing  broadened  the monetary  base causing  credit  to expand  and thus helped
to "crowd-in"  private investment. With a pegged  interest rate and no limitations  on credit, public
investment  induced  steady increases  in income  and therefore savings. Indeed,  with declining  levels
of indirect  tax rates, increased  savings  could  have financed  alone [sic]  the large fiscal  deficits. With
foreign  borrowing,  the surplus  savings  was available  for domestic  capital formation." [J. P. Hiey,
"Ivory  Coast - Stabilization  and Adjustment  Policies  Study",  WIDER, 1987]
20changed  as public  investment  strayed  into areas (e.g. manufacturing)  which  could have been left to
the private  sector, and which  failed  to generate  the income  required  to service  its debt financing.
Table 10: Public Investment  In Cote  d'Ivoire and Comparators
(as a Percentage  of Total  Investment)
Sector  /  Year  1975 1976  1977  1978  1979 11980  1981  11982 1983  1984  11983 196 1987  198
Meto  d'lvo1re  41  41  39  45  48  48  39  52  52  63  72  85  78  69
SSAfrIca  40  42  42  41  44  43  46  45  49  48  44  4  7t  46
OECD  18  17  17  17  16  17  1  1  17  16  16  15  15  14
Source:  DEC  AnatytIcal  Database
Public  Expenditure  -- Crowding  Out: The high  level  of government  spending  maintained  after
the end of its economic  boom  of the mid 1970s  began to bid scarce  resources  away  from the private
sector. Public  expenditure  reached  a record  level  in response  to revenues  associated  with  the 1976-8
boom  and stayed  high,  resulting  in a fiscal  deficit  that grew  to 12%  of GDP in 1981. Government
investment  began to drive up costs to the manufacturing  sector, reducing  its competitiveness.  By
initially  failing  to reduce  its investment  in response  to the terms  of trade shock  following  the 1976-78
boom,  the government  drove up the price of nontradables  (e.g. construction  services),  raising  costs
to both import-substituting  and export-oriented  industries.  The result was a less competitive
manufacturing  sector and an effective  appreciation  of the real exchange  rate  -- further aggravating
the balance  of trade deficit. Although  the Government  eventually  managed  to reduce investment
expenditure,  other expenditures  continued to grow, in large part because of the large cadre of
politically  influential  public  employees.  As the financial  crisis  deepened,  public  investment  virtually
cannibalized  private  investment. By 1989,  the estimated  fiscal  deficit  amounted  to a record 16%  of
GDP.  By the mid-1980s  (see table 10),  the public  sector's  share of total investment  was at record
levels  for a non-socialist  economy.
Financing  Expenditure  -- Borrowing:  Government  spending  in C6te d'Ivoire  is financed  in
three principal  ways: through  borrowing  in financial  markets,  through  taxation  (discussed  in section
V), and through  the accumulation  of arrears.'  Each appears  to have behaved  as a mechanism  for
crowding  out private  sector  activity.  One legacy  of excessive  expenditure  has been a tremendous  debt
burden. The government's  voracious  need for credit  was  supplied  in part by  private  international  and
domestic  capital  markets,  crowding  out private  borrowing.
Service  on the debt now  requires  revenues  that unproductive  investment  did not yield. Debt
service  skyrocketed  to an estimated  17% of GDP in 1989,  consuming  nearly  half of the nation's
I  Because  of its membership  in the CFA Franc  Zone, the C6te  d'Ivoire  cannot  unilaterally  resort
to printing  money  with which  to finance  its puAlic  expenditures.
21export earnings.  In 1990, these figures were projected to exceed 20% of GDP and fully 60% of
earnings from the export of goods and services,  before declining later in the decade.
Increasingly, the government has been unable to meet its external and internal debt service
obligations.  The indebtedness of  the central government and  public enterprises  has, inter.  alia,
contnbuted  to  an apparent  exhaustion of the capital of many banks.  Aggregate data show that
private investment dropped dramatically  in the mid 1980s,  beginning to recover in nominal (but not
real) terms only by the end of the decade.
Crowding out must be considered not just in static, but also in dynamic terms.  Even a fairly
brief excess in public expenditure may lead to many years of diminished resources to the private
sector, for two reasons.  First, government borrowing to finance a deficit involves a promise of a
stream of payments that will last for many years, thus policies to compensate for a deficit will also
endure.  For example, a recent World Bank study found that countries respond to external debt by
reducing investment, rather than by increasing  savings. 2" Second, recurrent expenditure commitments
(for personnel, inputs, and operation  and maintenance) are required in the wake of large public
investments.
Taxation: As detailed in Section V, GCI derives its revenue from a complex network of taxes.
One principal source of revenue from the rural economy, the Agricultural Financial Surplus (AFS),
actually tumed into a revenue hemorrhage during the later half of the 1980s. The complex web of
urban taxes became increasingly  onerous as the government attempted to draw greater revenue from
a withering urban private sector.  The number of large formal enterprises declined slightly  between
1982 and 1988, but their taxes increased by more than twice the increase in value added (28% vs.
12%). For small and medium enterprises (PMEs), the story is worse: the number of formal sector
PMEs (those reporting statistics to the government) declined by 10%, value added dropped by 27%,
yet taxes paid actually increased by 19%.  The percentage of GDP captured by taxes has actually
declined slowly  during the 1980s: it was 20.4% in 1980; 19.8% in 1985,  and 18.1% in 1989. With the
rapid decline of non-tax revenue (due, inter alia, to the growing deficit of CAISSTAB and of the
public enterprise  sector), an increasing share of the fiscal burden (i.e. public revenue generation)
appears to be shifting to a narrowing base of urban enterprises.
Arrears to  the  Private Sector:  Individual businesses and investors have unintentionally
assumed a large burden of government debt through the government's use of domestic payment
arrears to finance its deficit.  By the end of 1989,  the central government and other public entities
had  accumulated arrears  totaling 556 billion CFAF (over $2 billion, or  about  18% of  GDP).'
21 Luis Serven and Andres Solimano,  Private  Investment  and MacroeconomicAdjustment  in LDCs:
Theory, Country Eperience  and  Policy Implications  (Washington, DC:  Country  Economics
Department, World Bank, 1991)
'  There are indications of cross arrears, so this figure may exaggerate the net indebtedness of
the state to the private sector.
22Interviews suggested that this practice extends far beyond nonpayment of interest and principal on
loans from private banks.  In addition, the government no longer pays many of its bills owed to its
private suppliers and contractors, fails to refund excess taxes paid by private firms, and fails to pay
premiums  due  to  exporters  (a  centerpiece  of  CMte d'Ivoire's  effort  to  compensate  for  the
overvaluation of its currency).  Adding insult to injury, in spite of the fact that the government is
failing to pay the export premia, exporters are expected to treat (for tax purposes) putative premia
receipts as income, and may end up paying taxes on income from the Government which has not
materialized.
Almost every firm supplying the government, exporting or paying taxes with a refundable
component (such as the FNI investment and FNR training taxes) is owed money by the government.
For private firms, government payment arrears create pressure on their cashflow,  diminish potential
investment funds, and reduce the profitability of staying in business. Given the near exhaustion of
financing from banks, few businesses manage to  find external resources for investment or even
working capital.  Before the worsening of the financial crisis in 1988, the government was said to
commonly  take a year to pay its bills. Now, it has become common for the government agencies and
public enterprises to simply  ignore their debts and arrears.
A small, informal surve?y of SMEs supplying the government found all of them suffering
from the government's financial practices, some waiting three or more years for payment of sub-
stantial contracts. For those firms with private sector options, this has meant a substantial reduction
in the percentage of business transacted with the government. For those without this altemative, it
has meant missed payments or default on loans, missed payrolls, layoffs and financial losses.
Why have private companies allowed the government to build up such huge arrears?  First,
the government in the past has been a dominant force in the economy.  It  is by far the largest
consumer in numerous markets, hence an unavoidable customer.  Second, the  government may
previously have been a very good customer -- for while it was slow to pay, it paid full price where
other customers often insisted on discounts.  Particularly in a recessionary period, a government
contract with the possibility  of payment may appear better than nothing. Third, some suppliers have
no choice: in some cases, services are (more or less subtly) commanded, not demanded.
Fnally, a recent record of poor economic stewardship and uncertainty about Cote d'Ivoire's
political future clearly is deterring private investment. In particular, the continued growth of public
expenditure (and its increasing consumption content) in the face of declining  economic performance
and government revenues has shaken the confidence of investors and lenders, both domestic and
international.  The failure of the government to pay its debts (combined with unpredictable attempts
at incremental taxation) has reduced the security of property rights, hence the incentive for private
I  Six suppliers of  items ranging from construction services to  uniforms were  surveyed by
SOCOGEC, as a follow-up to the CECPS mission, during the second half of 1990.
23sector development.'  Economic uncertainty and the loss of competitiveness contributed to the
precipitous decline in private investment during the 1980s.
Public Enterprise: Public enterprises offer the richest area for exploring the impact of public
expenditure on private sector development because they typically  engage in activities which could be
performed by either  public or private sectors, and buy from or sell to the private sector.  Public
enterprises may crowd in by supplying or  creating demand for  private production of goods and
services. They may crowd out by using their easy access to public investment funds to best private
competitors. (Of course, their aggregate potential to drain puliic resources may  contribute to macro-
crowding out as well.)
Cote d'Ivoire's public enterprises have never been numerous -- a few dozen at their peak --
but they played an important role in both the country's modernization strategy and its economic
problems today.  Historically, public enterprises have drawn tremendously on  social resources,
contributing to macroeconomic  crowding out.  At the time of the coffee and cocoa boom of 1976-8,
GCI embarked on a program of enormous investment in a few agricultural processing industries
deemed strategically central to  CMte d'Ivoire's industrialization.  The government wanted these
industries in the hands of Ivoirians and saw public ownership as the best or only means to this end.
With  large  industry traditionally dominated by  French  and  other  non-Ivoirian owners, public
investment offered a  way to  expand indigenous control of modern industry.  Furthermore,  the
leadership  is  said  to  have  viewed  public enterprise  as  a  means  of  developing  indigenous
entrepreneurial capacity to play a larger part in future private sector development.
Hence, in the late 1970s,  the majority  of investment in manufacturing  was made by the state,
predominantly in industries processing the nation's primary agricultural products such as sugar, palm
oil, cotton and rubber.  Following 1980,  public investment  in this sector quickly  fell, but the industries
created have continued to place powerful demands on the public purse for investment and recurrent
costs. Since peaking at 138.5  billion CFAF in 1978,  investment in state owned enterprises fell in the
eighties to a range between 40 and 70 billion CFAF per year.  While some public manufacturing
enterprises yielded positive returns to the government due to their monopoly status, their net social
benefit is far  less clear.  By reasonable measures of productivity -- per  unit of fixed assets, per
employee, per  dollar of gross investment - public manufacturing enterprises compared poorly to
private ones.'
Public enterprises were preferentially  allocated resources that allowed the to bid both capital
and labor away from private enterprises. For example,  in 1989,  they employed some 208,000  workers.
I  Much of the crowding out in CMte  d'Ivoire has come from the seeming insecurity of property
rights  arising from  taxation  and  regulatory  policy and  the  unpredictable,  often  rent-seeking
enforcement of them.
- Helpful comments and information on this point were received from Klaus Lorch, then of
AFICO.
24Clearly, they contribute to market segmentation, where skilled workers are scarce, and all but a for-
tunate few of the unskilled face high rates of unemployment. However, it is the seemingly  excessive
and inefficient use of capital by public enterprises that represents their greatest economic impact.6
Table 13;  Net Financing to Parastatal  Sector (CFAF billion)
(negative  numbers  imply  public  subsidy  of  parastatals)
Enterprise  Type  Year 1982  |  1983  1984 1985  1986  1987  1  1988
iOOX State-Gwned  1  -49.51  -66.31  -40.4  -114.3|  -97.2|  -83.81  -85.21
(number)  (8)  (9)  j  (8)  (8)  (9)  (9)  (9)
Majority  State-Owned  -17.6  13.0  -14.8  -28.8  -3.7  9.3  14.8
(number)  (20)  (20)  (20)  (20)  (20)  (21)  (22)
Minority  State-Owned  24.4  -8.6  -30.8 48.2  14.4  29.8  41.4
(number)  (35)  (37)  (37)  (38)  (38)  (40)  (43)
Total  |  -42.71  -87.91  -86.01-134.91  -86.5  -43-7 -29.0
Source:  BOF
While no comprehensive data are available on linkages to the private sector, it is clear that
public enterprises have altered the course of private investment through linkages offered and those
denied.  Public enterprises encourage private investment through direct purchases and contracting
out  for services.  The decision of what intermediate inputs and services to  integrate  in public
enterprises is a significant one for private sector development -- particularly if the purchasing or
contracting fosters competition instead of allocating rents.
In Cote d'Ivoire, some public enterprises did indeed "crowd in" private enterprise.'  For
instance,  private  suppliers  to  the  large  agricultural parastatals  were  encouraged  to  invest;
unfortunately the crowding in often did not foster competitiveness. For example, the government
encouraged entrepreneurs to launch (or jointly venture) into production of packaging  for agricultural
products  - granting them enduring monopolies  over such supplies. The result has been that private
enterprises were created and expanded with considerable  dependence on their protective linkages to
the public sector and are now a  burden rather than an asset.  More  recently, even competitive
suppliers have been seriously hindered by the poor payment' and management record of most public
enterprises.
3' As a rough indication of the low capital productivity  of public enterprises, in 1988 they had
(according to BDF data) a value added to investment ratio of only .37, compared to .72 for large
private corporations.
n  This micro-crowding phenomenon in  no  way suggests that  the  overall level of  private
investment is larger than if a private alternative to public enterprise has been pursued.
'  The catalog of  problems private enterprises have with parastatal receivables ranges from
payment in kind (which SODESUCRE has employed) to non-payment (which abounds).
25Once the public  sector has decided  to invest in a sector, private competition  (and often
linkage)  is  commonly  ruled  out, even  when  no natural  monopoly  (hence  efficiency  justification)  exists.
For example, rigid regulations  on shipping  reduce competition  with the state-owned  SITRAM
corporation. Air Ivoire  enjoys  exclusive  privileges  for commercial  domestic  air travel,  while  access
to  military personnel subsidizes  its operation.  Although evidence from developed  countries
demonstrates  that the efficiency  losses  of pub!  c enterprises  are not necessarily  inherent to public
ownership,  public  ownership  often leads  to restrictions  on competition  to protect public  investments.
Even when linkages  with public  enterprises  and entities  are allowed,  government  can make
them profitable,  discouraging  long-term  investment. In some  cases,  public  enterprises  influence  the
regulation  of prices  of privately  produced  products  that they  use.  For example,  a large packaging
manufacturer  recently  had the regulated  price of its cocoa and coffee  sacks  reduced  below  cost by
the public  agency  which  also happens  to be its major  customer.
Privatization: If public  enterprises  often crowd  out private investment,  then, conversely,
privatization  and accompanying  reforms  may  be regarded  as  crowding  in: creating  new  opportunities
for profitable  private investment  where they  were previously  blocked. In one sense,  Cote d'Ivoire
may  have  actually  led other West-African  nation towards  privatization.  One study reports that,
at the end of 1987,  twenty-eight  firms,  in industry,  agricultural  processing,  tourism,  commerce  and
distnrbution,  and other fields  had been transferred  to majority  or full  private  ownership.  The means
by which this was done, however,  was a far cry from encouraging  competitive  private sector
development,  or obtaining  a market  price for the value of the firms. Instead,  reports suggest  that
owners  were often handpicked  by the government  and no regulatory  steps were taken to mitigate
existing  market concentration. One of the main reasons  behind this lack of transparency  in the
divestiture process is the government's  reluctance  to allow any sizeable  elimination  of jobs or
substantial  transfers  of managerial  authority  to non-Ivoirian  entrepreneurs.
In a different,  parallel  approach  to privatization,  the government  has transferred  management
responsibility  for its water and sanitation  services  to a private  enterprise  - through  concession  and
service contracts,  and is now moving  to place investment  decisions  in the hands of the private
contractor. Further,  it is has recently  concluded  a contract  with  a private  concessionaire  to manage
the deficit-plagued  public electric parastatals,  with the promise of substantial  savings  to  both
customers  and the govemment.  Hence,  by  extending  private  ownership  and investment  to previously
public  activities,  Cote d'Ivoire  is likely  to bring  about a substantial  expansion  of the private  sector.
Infrastructure: Productive  investment  in infrastructure  is generally  believed  to "crowd  in"
(accelerate  the rate of growth  of) private  sector activity,  by encouraging  both domestic  and foreign
investment. In CMte  dlIvoire,  it is credited  with facilitating  trade and opening  up large areas  of the
country  to commercial  agricultural  exploitation  and  extraction  of natural  resources. The productivity
of Cote d'Ivoire's investment  in infrastructure,  however,  has been hobbled both by some poor
9  See, for example Callaghy and Wilson,  Africa: Policy,  Reality, or Ritual in Raymond Vernon
(ed.), The Promise  of Privatization  (New  York: Council  on Foreign  Relations,  1988),  pp. 179-230
26investment  decisions  and by a highly  taxed  and regulated  and partially  monopolized  transportation
industry  that inhibits  the efficient  use of infrastructural  investment. In this sense,  transport policy
largely  determines  the extent to which  transportation  infrastructure  can crowd  in by controlling  the
profitability  and legality  of its private  use.
Highway  investments  illustrate  the expensive  consequences  of a preference  for prestige  over
productivity,  and construction  over maintenance.  During  the recessionary  first half  of the 1980s,  the
government  continued  to emphasize  the creation  of new,  over-designed  capacity  over the upkeep  of
old capacity.  Resources flowed to  the construction  of European-style  highways  where more
rudimentary  designs  and surfaces  would  have  sufficed. (Donors  often prefer design  criteria  familiar
to their own  engineers,  hence can heavily  bias public  investment  decisions  in this regard.) In the
meantime,  the value  of existing  highway  investment  was not fully  realized  due to underinvestment  in
its maintenance.  For example,  in 1985,  the budget  for road maintenance  was  some  35% below  the
level deemed  desirable  from an efficiency  perspective.29
With regard to the utilization  of public  investment,  the railway,  airports and ports each
provide examples  of how inefficient  transport policy  reduces infrastructural  efficiency  (or the
'crowding  in"  effect). The social  utility  of public  investment  in the railway  was minimized  by the
actions  of a joint Burkinab6-Ivoirian  railroad  monopoly,  which  operated inefficiently,  accumulated
a hundred  billion  CFAF  debt and was  owed  some  68.7  billion  CFAF  by the two  governments.  In air
travel, the value of huge investments  in international  airports  is minimized  by the market power
granted to Air Afrique (and its French counterpart)  - while  would-be  exporters  are deterred by
prohibitive  air-freight  rates.  Similarly,  sea shipping  is (with regulatory  complicity)  controlled  by
SITRAM and three foreign companies,  and protected by a "code of conduct"  that all but bars
competitive  entry.  Even the use of highways  is diminished  by freight licensing  procedures that
strengthen  local monopolies  and contribute  to truck  overloading  and fleet underutilization.3
The strongest  complaints  we received,  however,  concerned  electricity. Until  quite recently,
electric power generation and distnbution  was handled by a public enterprise, EECI [Energie
Electrique  de la CMte  d'Ivoirel. Plagued  by chronic  mismanagement,  the company  ran substantial
operating  deficits,  losing  some  SUS  350  million  in a few  years  and falling  deeply  into arrears  to the
public  sector. In spite  of provisions  of a Bank  financed  Energy  Sector  Adjustment  Loan [ESAL]  to
stimulate  improved  management,  EECI has failed  to improve  its performance,  suffering  cost  overruns
3 Two  other psd  issues  surrounding  highways  are worth  noting. Highways  were inefficiently  used
because pricing  did not reflect costs attnbutable to different  users, with heavy  vehicles  implicitly
subsidized.  Force account,  rather than contracting,  was  used for several  types  of maintenance  and
rehabilitation  work,  because  private  capacity  was not perceived  to exist. Yet from a private  sector
development  perspective,  consideration  should  be given  to encouraging  the creation  of new  private
capacity,  not simply  utilizing  that which  already  exists.
31  As a result  of regulatory  action  and/or  permissiveness  of cartel-type  arrangements,  trucks  are
often prevented from carrying freight in both  directions.  This, of course, considerably  and
unnecessarily  increases  the cost of transport  to the whole  economy.
27and an increase  in receivables,  due to failures  in billing  and collection  of charges for electricity.
Manufacturers  we spoke to uniformly  complained  about  the cost of electricity  and corruption  of the
billing  system. One manufacturer,  who said  electricity  comprised  15%  of his total costs,  suggested
that his competitors  were able to reduce  their bill 99%  by paying  bribes  -- leaving  those who  would
not or could not bnbe to foot the full  cost of the system. Another  believed  that his competition  in
Nigeria  paid  one eighth  as much  as he did  for electricity.  (The state has recently  tumed  management
of the electric utility  over to a private  company  under  a 15 year  lease.
The lesson,  then, is that infrastructure  cannot be assumed  to crowd in private enterprise
unless  the policies  goveming  its use allow  (better  yet, foster)  competition  and the infrastructure  itself
is well  managed. When the govemment  does not attend to ensuring  competitive  pricing  and open
access  to the use of these investments,  full  value  cannot  be realized.  When  government  is  concerned
with carefully  controlling  the use of infrastructure  to privilege  some  and exclude  others, as well  as
to protect its own enterprises,  efficient  private  sector  development  will  be hindered.
Procurement:  Given  the substantial  presence  of the government  in the economy,  it has a
large potential role as  a customer for private sector goods and services.'  Formally,  the
procurement  procedure  appears  designed  to encourage  the competitive  supply  of goods  and services.
Furthermore, officially,  small and  medium enterprises are  actively solicited as suppliers for
govermment  contracts. In practice,  both the system  of payment  and the bidding  process mitigate
against  all but favored  SMEs. (The horrendous  problems  with payment  are described  in earlier in
this section.)
There is a formal  bidding  process  that is intended  as a transparent  means  of finding  low  cost
suppliers. Anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that this process  is commonly  circumvented  for all but large
public  works  contracts. For the recurrent  procurement  of goods  (such  as office  furniture),  contracts
valued  at below  8 million  CFAF (about $30,000)  are directly  negotiated  without  bidding. These
contracts  are at the discretion  of department  directors  and other middle  managers. Thus, there is
every  incentive  for breaking  down  larger  contracts  into smaller  pieces  whenever  possible  to maintain
discretion  over the awarding  of contracts,  hence access  to the informal  benefits  they can generate.
While  this  process  may,  in principle,  improve  the chances  of SMEs  winning  supply  contracts,  it awards
complicity,  not competitiveness.  As efficient  production  is  not the key  to profit,  enterprises  will  focus
instead  on seeking  rents.
The lack  of timeliness  in the government's  payment  system  makes  it difficult  for small  firms
without  substantial  financial  reserves  or easy access  to credit to act as suppliers. First, in private-
private  transactijons,  smaller  firms  engaged  in light  manufacturing  typically  demand  an advance  from
private consumers  for the purchase of raw materials. This was observed  in both the furniture
manufacturing  and clothing  industries,  and is reportedly  true for automobile  repairs  as well  (where
-1  For example, in the United States, of $965 million  in public spending at all levels of
government  in 1988,  $462  million  purchased  goods  and  services  from  outside  organizations.  Donahue,
1989  (ibid).
28spare parts must be paid for in advance).  The government  not only will no longer provide  such
advances,  but typically  demands  a guarantee  (or performance  bond)  from  the company  - which  favors
larger,  financially  stronger  enterprises.
More important,  once the good or service  is delivered,  the government  is notoriously  bad
about paying  its debts. Before  the worsening  of the financial  crisis  in 1988,  the government  was said
to commonly  take a year to pay its bills. Now,  it has become  common  for the government  agencies
and public  enterprises  to simply  ignore  their  debts  and arrears  (or simply  lack  the means  to pay). An
small,  informal  survey' of SMEs supplying  the govermment  found all of them suffering  from the
government's  financial  practices,  some waiting  three or more years for payment of substantial
contracts. For those  firms  with  private  sector  customers,  this  has meant  a substantial  reduction  in the
percentage  of business  transacted  with the government.  For those without,  this has meant missed
payments  or default  on loans,  missed  payrolls,  layoffs  and financial  losses.
The experience  of a small  training  firm  exemplifies  both the potential  and current  problems
for private  businesses  contracting  with the government.  The firm  was created  to meet the demand
for training  programs  created  by  the govemment,  through  the training  fund  financed  by the FNR tax
Recently,  however,  the govemment  has not been paying  FNR commitments,  and this firm  was left
with an unbearable  receivables  balance,  and forced  to reduce  staff by two thirds.
A shoe manufacturer  reported another type of problem: after winning,  and fulfilling  a
competitive  bid and subsequent  contract  for the supplv  of shoes  to the police,  it took more  than two
years  for him to be paid. His mistake  was to underbid  other manufacturers  (who  the entrepreneur
indicated  were setting a price three times the cost of production)  and refuse to 'lubricate the
convoluted  process  of delivery  certification  and of payment  authorization.  The result  was a two  and
a half year  wait for payment,  and the end of his interest in supplying  government  contracts.
One consequence  of the government's  behavior  has been  a reduction  in competition  for those
contracts submitted for competitive  bidding.  This, in turn, has reinforced the trend towards
negotiated  (gig  a gre)  procurement. Thus  the procurement  process  is playing  a progressively  smaller
role in the encouragement  of a competitive  market  economy. 34
While the formal  procedures  for contracting  and procurement  appear to sharply  limit  the
'  Six suppliers of items ranging from construction  services to uniforms  were surveyed  by
SOCOGEC,  as a follow-up  to the CECPS  mission,  during  the second  half of 1990.
3  Why do some businesses  continue to deal with the state?  An official  of the Ministry  of
Economy  and Fnance offered three reasons:  1)  Price inflation  - some enterprises are always
interested  in dealing  with the state because  (it pays)  high prices. 2) There are those  who are paid
quickly.  3) In some  cases,  when someone  sells  the state goods,  [sJhe'll  deliver  half to the state. The
deliverer  gets half for goods or services  and splits  the rest with government  functionary. Or [s]he
delivers  the full order, keeps half the money,  and the functionary  returns half the goods to the
supplier  to resell,  again dividing  the gains.
29dealings  of small  enterprise  with the government,  subcontracting  opens some  opportunities  (see the
labor  issues  section  below).  In much  road and  building  construction,  for example,  initial  contracts  are
awarded  to large  companies  that are able to provide  the guarantees  required  by  the government.  Yet
these companies  are able to lower  their bids  and minimize  fixed  costs  by subcontracting  major  parts
of their work to SMEs, even informal  ones.  Thus the absence of enforced regulation  against
subcontracting  appear  to enhanez  efficiency  and opportunity  for small  firms,  as  well  as lowering  costs
to the government.  Until economies  of scale  in dealing  with the government  can be eliminated,  not
enforcing  laws against this practice remains an important  encouragement  of small-scale  private
enterprise.
Salaries and Benefits -- Crowding  Out Skilled  Labor:  GCI routinely  bids away  from the
private  sector the most educated  members  of the labor  force. After investing  well  over one hundred
thousand  dollars  in the education  of its top students,  the CMte  d'Ivoire  guarantees  the graduates  of
its institutions  of higher  education  employment  as civil  servants. Public  employment  thus becomes,
at the professional  levels,  an entitlement  program  for graduates. In spite of two pay  freezes  in the
1980's,  public  sector  salaries  average  10.3  times  the per capita GDP,  even before adding  in generous
benefits (that double their cost to the government)  and access  to informal  sources  of income.3A  If
the United States paid comparably,  the average  civil  servant  would  earn about $200,000  per year
(coincidentally  the salary  of its President).
No competitive  industry  is likely  to be able to afford  to match  this  level  of compensation  for
a substantial  portion of its labor force.  Few graduates are like!y to be attracted to a life of
entrepreneurship  when offered  the certain  altemative  of guaranteed  high income  of a government
job.  Hence, government  policies  serve to deny the private sector the use of the best educated
Ivoirians,  and drive up the wages  for many  other Ivoirians. Developing  businesses  meeting  these
levels  of compensation  would  have grave  difficulties  staying  competitive.
Equally important,  the Ivoirians  most capable of becoming  successful  entrepreneurs and
employers  tend not to value private  business  as a vocation. As modem business  began  to emerge,
it was generally  perceived  to be the realm  of foreigners  (traditionally  the French) and the most
respectable  roles for Ivoirians  (outside  of agriculture)  were either as educators  (a public  sector  job)
or in government.  In addition  to any  cultural  roots this phenomenon  may  have,  public  employment
policies  contnbuted  powerfully  to create role models  that tended  to steer Ivoirians  away  from  business
pursuits.
With the most educated  and articulate  Ivoirians,  those with the greatest  leadership  capacity,
almost universally  finding employment with the  government,  there  is  an  almost irresistible
constituency  for continued  expenditure  on public  employees.  At the same  time that "modernW  [non-
agricultural  formal] sector employment  declined 1.5% between 1985 and  1989 public sector
3'  This high average  apparently  masks  substantial  differences  between positions. Teachers  (a
third of permanent  state employees)  earn substantially  more than the average,  with their wage  bill
accounting  for 60% of the totaL
30employment  increased  by 7.2%. Thus while  public  investment  has played  a diminishing  role in the
budgetary  crisis,  the salary  bill had grown  by 1989  to consume  some  43%  of public  receipts  and 27%
of total government  expenditure.  Personnel  cost some  369  billion  CFAF  in 1989,  or 11.7%  of GNP.
Human Services  -- Crowding  In and Out. Expenditures  on human  services  have  two  central
impacts  on the private  sector: enhancing  its capacity  and directly  employing  or excluding  it in service
delivery. First, in the same way  that highways  can make natural resources  available  for economic
exploitation,  education and health services augment the economic  value of  human resources.
Investments  in human  capital  can thus complement  investments  in physical  capital,  'crowding"  them
in. An educated  and healthy  labor  and entrepreneurial  force  would  appear a minimal  precondition
to rapid private sector development.
Given the narrowing  constraints  faced by Cote d'Ivoire on public expenditure,  efficient
investment  in human  resources  seems  vital to PSD. Yet its record is poor. The standard  indicators
suggest  the government  gets little  for its large  investment  in health and  education. Specifically,  over
half of the substantial  public  budget  goes to health and education,  Cote d'Ivoire  suffers  a low  life
expectancy  (53 years)  and high rate of infant mortality  (106  per thousand)  for a country  of its per
capita  GNP. 3'  Medical  resources  are concentrated  in Abidjan,  where  the doctor/patient  ratio is 16
times higher than in some rural areas. 3'  Facilities  elsewhere  are overtaxed  and often deliver  poor
services.  Resort to  private practitioners  is common.  Yet government  policy rules out  real
competition  in the health  sector -- there are no private  hospitals.  Furthermore,  the regulations  and
paperwork  tied up in working  at a hospital  lead  some  physicians  with a private  practice  to avoid  them
altogether. Again,  a flawed  regulatory  environment  may  prevent  the ful realization  of the value of
investments  in health facilities.
The story is very similar  in education,  where the enormous  drain of teacher  salaries  leaves
little for investment  in facilities.  The shortage  of facilities  and  abundance  of personnel  has led to an
interesting  form of crowding  in.  A number  of private schools  have arisen teaching  the mandated
government  curriculum  and using publicly  paid teachers.  Some of these schools  offer superior
facilities  to  public schools,  yet all offer the same curriculum  and draw from the same pool of
classroom  personnel.
Health and education  appear promising  areas for allowing  regulated  private entry. Private
hospitals  and privately  staffed  private  schools  hold the potential  for relieving  unmet  demand  for the
3 According  to one Bank  source,  "These  figures  are comparable  to those  of Kenya,  where  GNP
per capita  is roughly  half that of Cote d'Ivoire,  and health and education  expenditures  are only  30%
of recurrent  budget,  life  expectancy  is  6 years  longer  and the infant  mortality  rate is 24 points  lower."
3  A rough idea of priorities is revealed in  the 1990 "Special  Budget of Investment and
Equipment".  130  million  CFAF  are allocated  for repair and equipment  for all rural dispensaries,  as
compared  to 200 million  CFAF  being spent to air condition  one section in each of 2 hospitals  in
Abidjan.
31V. TAXATTION  AND PRIVATE  SECrOR DEVELOPMENT
Urban Taxes
Overview Taxes are seen by all entrepreneurs as the greatest obstacle  to  expansion  of their
businesses.  This undoubtedly  reflects  the high prevailing  levels  of taxation,' which  have  increased
with recent attempts  by the Government  to intensify  revenue  raising  from a shrinking  tax base. As
enterprise profits  decline,  taxes  become  increasingly  focused  on parameters  other than profits  (e.g.
turnover or value  added) -- thus magnifying  the effect  of the crisis  on the financial  performance  of
enterprises in the formal sector.  In addition,  many components  of the tax system  involve  pre-
financing  and are supposed  to lead to rebates -- which tend to introduce biases favoring  large
enterprises  over SMEs  and well-connected  over poorly  connected  entrepreneurs.
Conventional  wisdom  assumes  the existence  of a clear boundary  between a heavily  taxed
formal  sector,  and an untaxed  informal  sector. The latter is  comprised  of microenterprises  and larger,
so called "lax"  firms that have slipped  out of the formal sector to avoid taxes and regulations.
According  to this view,  if only the informal  sector (including  the so-called  fraudeurs)  taxed,  fiscal
constraints  would  be alleviated,  the burden  on formal  enterprise  reduced,  and  competitiveness  would
be restored.
In fact, almost  every  enterprise in Cote d'Ivoire  (except  those engaged  solely  in smuggling)
pays  some taxes. Instead  of a sharp distinction  between  formal  and informal  on the basis  of their
fulfillment  of tax obligations,  there is a continuum  of compliance 4'.  On one extreme are large
corporations  whose  high visibility  (particularly  if foreign-owned)  makes  the whole arsenal  of taxes
inescapable:  licensing  taxes,  import  duties,  VAT,  profit  taxes,  payroll  taxes,  and contnbutions  to the
investment,  training,  and social  security  funds. On the other extreme  are microenterprises  that pay
arbitrarily  assessed  licensing  taxes  and escape  most  of the other burdens. The majority  of enterprises
fail somewhere  in between, and it is unclear which type of enterprise actually  bears the greater
relative burden. Furthermore,  linkages  (such as subcontracting)  between different  types  of firms
somewhat  reduce  the burden of taxes  on the larger,  more formal  ones.
Nonetheless,  there appears  to be a significant  penalty  for formalization  by  SMEs. This  results
from a combination  of the financial  cost of taxation,  the inordinate  time cost for managers  of small
businesses  to  achieve regulatory  compliance,  and the biases in formal benefits favoring  large
enterprises,  such as those in the allocation  of loans  and investment  incentives.
4  Tax revenues  in the 1980-87  period  averaged  20%  of GDP.
41  There also indications  that "leakage"  is higher for smaller,  less formal  firms: compliance  as
measured  by Government  revenues  and as measured  by enterprise payments  to tax authorities  are
further apart for these enterprises  than for larger,  formal  ones.
33highest  quality  services,  and may  release public  resources  for more efficient  investment  in primary
services  for the less privileged. Indeed, many people already  resort to private facilities  to avoid
problems  of crowding,  waiting  and rationing  in existing  public  social  services.
Education  also  raises  a host of issues  about  the specific  characteristics  of public  expenditures
in that sector. Education  policy  is a subject  beyond  the scope  of this  paper, but there are two  aspects
worth noting because of the particularly  negative  impact they appear to have on private sector
development. The first is that, while  the system  produces  relatively  few university-level  graduates
each year  and a large  number  of school  leavers  at early  grade  levels,  the entire curriculum  is oriented
towards preparing  students for advanced  studies, particularly  in the humanities. In absence of
adequate  vocational  or other training  for school  leavers,  the end result  is that the major product  of
the schools  is students  with no marketable  skills.
The second,  subtler  impact  of public  expenditure  on education  is its likely  effect  on attitudes
towards  business. Schools  apparently  foster attitudes  that elevate  the status  of government  service
(including  teaching)  relative to the value of private entrepreneurship. Combined  with powerful
incentives  created by government  employment  and compensation  policies,  this means that the best
and brightest  Ivoirian  graduates  have generally  not been inclined  to participate  in private sector
enterprises.
Support Services  for Private Enterpise  - Crowding  In.  The Govemment has tried to
encourage  SMEs  through  a variety  of specific  programs,  often aiming  to broaden  the role of Ivoirian
entrepreneurs  in the private  sector. Thus,  there is an Office  of Ivoirian  Enterprise,  a Committee  to
Assist  and Promote  National  Enterprise  (CAPEN),  and an Ivoirian  Industrial  Development  Bank.'
These efforts  seem to have  suffered  from the budget  constraints,  weak  administrative  capacity,  and
conflicting  incentives  that pervade  public  administration  in Cote d'Ivoire. An expensive  program  to
"Ivorize"  the retail trade failed  abysmally9'  because  it ignored  business  fundamentals.
Unlike  tax and regulatory  authorities,  agents of government  assistance  are largely  unknown
to small  entrepreneurs  -- as they  have  little  incentive  to undertake  outreach  efforts. In addition,  the
goals  of efforts and strategies  of programs  to reach SMEs and microenterprises  have been poorly
defined,  caught  in the dilemma  of the government  desire to assist  small  enterprises  and to control
them through  regulation  and taxation.
I  There is even a quasi-governmental  committee  (CONOSI)  to "organize"  (meaning  formalize)
informal  sector operators.
3  The "DISTRIPAC"  project, in the  1970s,  to create a network of Ivorian shop-keepers
apparently  resulted in public  outlays  of CFAF 18 billion  - with negligible  results.
32Overall, the implication  of this finding is that Cote d'Ivoire's resource mobilization  problem
is not merely one of extending taxes to an untaxed sector  - for all businesses are taxed.  Instead,
the problem is one of reforming taxes to encourage private sector growth,  and improving  enforcement
on firms already paying taxes to increase and reduce leakage.  For all the attention that has been
given to regulation and red tape, it is clear that the complexity  and inconsistency of tax regulation
and enforcement constrains business more than any other regulations (recall table 6).
Taxation of Formal Enterprises  As indicated above, the government of CMte  d'Ivoire derives
its revenue from a complex network of taxes. During the 1980s,  the burden of taxes has come to fall
more heavily on a diminishing numiber  of private enterprises, with the heaviest rate among formal
enterprises falling on SMEs -- for whom taxation appears to have crossed the Lafferian turning point,
past which progressively  higher effective tax rates tend to yield lower revenues. Table 7 also suggests
that, as profits of many  firms shrank, the government has increased indirect (i.e. not based on profit)
taxation. This could result in an untenable burden for struggling,  marginal firms.
Table 7:  Firm Size and Tax Burden (in CFAF)
Category//Year  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988i I  Taxes  Paid  (mn)  128.111133.21  142.75  145.37  159.84  153.37  175.75
NuTber  of  Firms  799  1  806  802  793  790  7  7
LargeIEnterprises  Tax/Finm  (000's)  160.34 165.27 177.99  183.31  202.33  196.88  224.74
Large  Enterprises.  _  -_ 
(priv.  & pubtic)  Value  Addedmn)  691.43  724.23  747.19  806.72  825.94 M.49  815.33
Tax/VA  (X)  18.67  18.39  19.10  18.02  19.35  19.85  21.56
(Tax-Prof.  Tax)/VA  16.05  16.24  16.92  15.20  16.05  16.51  18.89
Taxes  Paid  (mn)  17.33  17.98  21.18  24.70  23.54  20.77  20.63
Number  of  Firms  1,684  1,680  1,624  1,631  1,571  1,484  1,510
Tax/Firm  10.29  10.70  13.04  15.14  14.98  14.00  13.66
Small  & Nediua  -…
Enterprises  Vatue added (mn)  105.37  118.39  118.33  121.16  101.50  84.55  76.63
Tax/VA tX)  16.45  15.20  17.48U 24.341  27.85  27.10  26.92
(Tax-Prof.  Tax)/VA  12.50  10.76  13.281  19.841  21.60  22.61  18.35
Source:  BDF/CECPS
Licensing: The licensing  tax (patente), is collected from virtually  all enterprises with any kdnd
of a fixed location, and is roughly assessed on the basis of the business premises' rental value.  It
34appears to have a roughly  equal impact  on large and medium  companies,' falling  less heavily  on
small  registered  firms. As the patente is invariant  with profit or sales (and tax agents have been
reluctant  to reduce assessments  during the crisis),  it represents  a significant  fuxed  cost of staying  in
business  for many  firms.
VAT: Cote  d'lvoire's  value-added  tax (VAT)  is assessed  at different  rates  for different  items.
The simultaneous  existence  of several rates and insufficiently  precise definitions  of the different
categories  creates strong incentives  for entrepreneurs  to pressure  the government  to classify  their
products  in less  taxed  categories  -- and  the likelihood  that large,  better connected  enterprises  will  fare
better than smaller  ones. Interviews  suggested  that the classification  of a commodity  could  make  or
break its profitability,  and even large international  companies  sometimes  had products  crushed  by
inappropriate  classification,  hence a high VAT rate.
Given  the limitations  in private  accounting  practices  and public  monitoring  capacity,  precise
administration  of the VAT or a profits  tax would  be nearly  impossible.  Since  most SMEs keep at
best a partial set of books,  it is not rare for them to be subject  to the VAT even when their book
keeping  is inadequate  to the taslk The common  solution  belies  the whole  concept  of the VAT: the
tax inspector  assesses  an estimated  VAT  which  then becomes  a negotiable  but "sticky"  tax liability.
Imor  Taxes: As a result  of efforts  to effectively  devalue  the real exchange  rate, the import
tariff averages  70%.4 However,  the rate varies widely  and there are a variety of fees (e.g. for
storage)  and penalties  that can be assessed  by the customs  service. As a result,  customs  officials  are
possessed  of extraordinary  discretion  which,  according  to a variety  of entrepreneurs  and officials,  is
broadly  abused.' The resulting  process  is not only  inordinately  expensive,  but quite time-consuming
and unpredictable. Large,  specialized  importing  companies  have professionals  who deal only  with
customs. The difficulty  of the process  is particularly  important  for mid-sized  firms  that attempt to
export: their managers  simply  do not have  the time and energy  to obtain  exemptions  for inputs  used
in export products.
High  import  tariffs  (needed,  in part, to compensate  for the overvalued  currency)  are having
the ultimate  Lafferian  effect: they  so increase  the incentives  for smuggling  that they  not only  reduce
<  The CECPS  survey  shows  it averages  about 1% of turnover.
".  This figure may  be tariff VAT inclusive. A study of scheduled  tariff in 1989  suggests  an
average  rate on manufactured  goods  of 34%,  with a range  from 0 to 151%. Sucb  a range creates  a
substantial  rent potential  for those  with discretion  over the classification  of goods.
4  When  a dozen microentrepreneurs  in Bouake  were asked  zheir  first priority  for removing  one
source of government  interference  in business,  they unanimously  pointed to custom duties and
hassles.
If
35The FNR was yet another  rebatable  tax  a training  fund  was  established  through  mandatory
contributions  and then allocated  to enterprises  that presented  credible  employee  training  programs.
While,  again,  this tax probably  ended up discriminating  against  SMEs  it had an unexpected  (though
ephemeral) PSD effect:  the availability  of FNR funding  for training spurred the  creation of
numerous  private  enterprises  to provide  training  services.  However,  more  recently  FNR  contributions
have degenerated  into another source  of general revenue. Payments  fom  the training  fund have
stopped (and the newly  created  training  fims are left to fend for themselves).
Other  Taxes: A number  of other taxes  lmit the resources  available  to the private  sector (and
incentives  for investment  at the margin),  each in a distinct  way. Taxes  account  for 65% of the pump
price of gasoline. During  the 1980s,  water prices  to a few hundred  industrial  customers  contained
an enormous  tax component  that apparently  financed  new  investment  in the water and sanitation
sector,  connections  for low  income  neighborhoods,  an ambitious  rural  water  supply  program,  and  even
the arrears  of government  agencies  and enterprises.  Similarly,  electricity  prices  have  contained  a tax
component.
As  deficits  mounted  in the 1980s  and traditional  revenue  sources  diminished,  the Government
increased  tax rates and added new  taxes.  Yet higher  rates fell on an ever shrincing  private  formal
economy,  yielding  an approximately  constant  level  of revenues.' Overall,  foreign  owned  companies
paid  higher  taxes  than domestic-owned  companies.  Large  private  companies  paid  far higher  effective
taxes  than did public  ente. - ;  s (those with a majority  of shares  held by the Ivoirian  state),  which
tend to benefit from  special  tax advantages  and appear to have  little taxed  profit. Taxes  besides  the
profit tax paid  by public  enterprises  rose substantially  as a percent of value added during  the 1980s
(see table 8). Because  a large  component  is not based  on income  or profit, in recessionary  years,  tax
assessments  do not fully  accommodate  the reduction  in income  suffered  by many,  especiaDly  smalier
firms. Even  the profit tax carries  a minimum  assessment  (often, it appears,  CFAF 1,000,000),  even
for firms  facing  large losses.
Withholding  Taxes and Working  Ca"ital: Yet, along with the level of taxes, their timing
weighs  heavily  on private  enterprises. The use of withholding  and rebatable  taxes  requires  firms  to
pay  taxes  before the firm  has the revenue  on which  the tax is based. The result  is  to deprive  the firm
of working  capital  to purchase  inventory  and inputs  for production,  provide  sales credits,  or cover
other current  expenses. It shifts  a part of the government's  financing  problems  to the private  sector.
In an environment  in which  bank credit  has been mostly  exhausted,  in large  part due to government,
this may  pose a critical  constraint  on enterprises.
I  The number  of large formal  enterprises  declined  slightly  between 1982  and 1988,  but their
taxes increased  by more than twice the increase  in value added (28% vs. 12%). For small and
medium  enterprises  (PMEs),  the story  is  worse: tie number  of formal  sector PMEs  (those  reporting
statistics  to the government)  declined  by 10%,  value added  dropped  by 27%,  yet taxes  paid  actually
increased  by 19%.
37tax  collections  but also are accentuating  the crisis  of manufacturers  facing  fraudulent  cnmpetition'.
By  most accounts,  large  quantities  of heavily  taxed  categories  of goods  come  in through  neighboring
countries  -- a flow  that is unlikely  while  the relationship  of domestic  to foreign  prices  (combined  with
full convertability)  holds  and high import  tariffs  are in effect.
Profits.  Investment:  There is a 40% tax  on profits,  to which  until recently  was  added a 10%
profit  tax for a (theoretically  refundable)  National  Investment  Fund (FNI). As noted in the section
on arrears,  the government  has withheld  many  payments  owed to the private  sector in recent years,
induding  tax rebates. The FNI is theoretically  refundable  to industries  with a government-approved
investment plan.  In  practice, access to  this Fund has proved discriminatory  against smaller
enterprisese and may have introduced  extraneous  factors into private investment  decisions. For
whatever  reasons,  larger  firms  apparently  have  an easier time convincing  the oversight  committee  of
the value of their use of FNI funds.
Table 8:  Tax/Value  Added Ratio by Enterprise Type
Enterprise  Type  1982  1988
T  Small  and Nediun  .16  .27 Total  TaxesI 
l  atLarge  Private  .19  .22 I  Value  Added  II t  Large  Public  .16  .20
Small  and  Nedium  .13  .18
(Total  Taxes  - Profit  Tax)  Large  Private  .16  .19
Value  Added
j  Large  Public  .14  .19
Source:  BDF/CECPS
Payroll  Taxes:  Labor  inputs  also  fall  under  substantial  taxation.  Entrepreneurs  estimated  that
the taxes  and mandatory  benefit regulations  applying  to labor add  between 30 and 50% to labor
costs. Payroll  taxes  include a social  security  tax (CNPS)  and a training  tax (FNR). The CNPS  is
probably  the most widely  evaded tax (or quasi-tax)  and an effort to enforce its payment  more
thoroughly  (which  appears  to be wisely  lacking)  would  undoubtedly  result in further  reductions  in
formal  employment.
I  Competition  from a  muggled  manufactures  is seen as a major  threat by many  large  enterprises
(see table 6). Domestic  textile  production,  for instance,  has declined  by about  50%o  over the last four
years - due to the roughly  equai effect of demand  contraction  and fraudulent  imports. Similarly,
formal (duty-paying)  importers  of many  consumer  items are instead procuring  the same imported
items domestically  - cheaper.
"  Helpful  information  on this was  received  from Klaus  Lorch, then of AFlCO.
36The problem  is growing  in that C6te dlvoire recently  enacted a new  forfeiture  tax. In June
1990 the  already infamous 5% withholding  (p#Jtkvement) tax on  turnover was imposed on
manufacturers  with the intention  of extracting  revenues  from  private  traders  deemed  to be avoiding
other forms  of taxation. The theory  was  that this  withholding  tax (though  having  all the appearance
of a VAT surcharge)  would  not be passed  on to transfer  prices  but would  be temporarily  absorbed
by the enterprises  - which  would  eventuaDy  be able  to recover  it through  matching  rebates  on their
other tax bils.  Although  theoretically  rebatable  and/or creditable  against  other taxes  paid, it may
deprive  many  firms  of the funds  they need to operate during the course  of the fiscal  year. 4 Given
the institutional  realities of the implementation  of past rebates and credits, for enterprises that
regularly  meet aD  their tax obligations  the 5% withholding  tax would,  at best, represent  a liquidity
drain -- in an economy  where fiscal  mismanagement  is already  a prime cause of tight liquidity. At
worst - if the rebate is only allowed from the profit tax -- it would represent additional taxation,
enforceable  only  on the already  over-taxed  dutiful  enterprises  and quite damaging  to their financial
health.49
In fact, the objective  of broadening  the tax  base by having  traders (who  are presumed  to pay
no taxes) absorb the 5% surcharge  collected  through their suppliers  can only be achieved  with
undesirable,  and difficult  to enforce  price  controls  at the point of final  sale. Whether  or not this can
be achieved,  it may be unrealistic  to expect that traders  operating with profit margins  of a few
percentage  points  (under pressure  of a highly  competitive,  even if informal,  environment)  to be able
to bear a 5% turnover tax  Thus, it is unlikely  that the 5% withholding  will expand  the tax base.
In fact, if it increases  taxation,  it could even reduce the tax base by enhancing  the incentives  for
informalization  of the supply  of manufactures  (through increasing  smuggling  and underdeclaration
of domestic  production)  and by further  depressing  demand.
Taxes  and Unregistered  Firms Licensing  taxes  (patente)  represent,  in practice,  the main  tax
liability  of most small and micro-enterprises.  Anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that the amount paid is
negotiated  between entrepreneurs  and revenue agents, and that the agents have been loathe to
reduce  assessments  in years  of recession.  Depending  on the relative  negotiation  skills  and power  of
entrepreneurs  and agents,  the payment  can vary  substantially.  There are clear indications  that there
is considerable  leakage" between the amount collected  by agents and the amount reaching  the
treasury. This  may  reflect,  in part, the high  transaction  cost of this  labor-intensive  mode  of collection,
but nonetheless  suggests  that small  informals  do not escape  taxation.
Attempts  to tax the smaller  enterprises  and traders  are likely  to be futile under  the present
circumstances,  and risk  causing  significant  damage  to the private  sector  which  is not compensated  by
any  significant  public  revenue  gains. The 5% withholding  tax is one such attempt. The unfortunate
possibility  is that, if fully implemented,  it might drive small competitive  traders entirely out of
business,  leaving  larger  oligopolies  to dominate  markets.
The reaction  of entrepreneurs  to the new 5% tax is uniformly  negative.
4  But note the poor record the Government  has on rebates:  export premium,  FNI, FNR
38Agricultural Tax:  The AFS
Traditionally, the  Ivoirian government tapped  agriculture as a  major source of revenue
through the Agricultural Financial Surplus (AFS).  The government drew surplus from agricultural
exports (mostly coffee and cocoa) both through a fixed tax and through the difference between the
export price of commodities received and the stabilized price paid to farmers.  Between 1980 and
1984, the AFS averaged 5% of GDP.  Since 1987, however, the stabilization of the price of basic
commodities has required net expenditures by the  Caisse de  Stabilisation des Prix des Produits
Agricoles (CAISSTAB), due  to  deteriorating international  terms of  trade.  A  major source of
govemment revenue turned into a major expenditure as CAISSTAB's  net income turned seriously
negative (see table 11) after 1986. Only recently have reforms related to the structural adjustment
program have since lowered support prices to reduce the budgetary hemorrhage.
Table 11: CAISSTAB  Operations, 1986-90
1986  1987  1988 1  19891 1990
Not  Stabilization  Fund  Revenue  135  59  -104 |  -170 1  s
(of  which): coffee  63  -7  59  -136  -10
cocoa  100  3  -21  -13  -40
cotton  -21  -17  16  - 41
I  other  |  7  -8a  -8  -2
source:  Worid Sank ("Exemen  des depenses publiques")
Summary The current tax structure weighs heavily on a shrinking base of urban firms.  By
hitting small and medium firms hardest, it acts as a substantial obstacle to growth and a disincentive
to cross the threshold from informality to formality. Increased reliance on indirect taxes and new
forms of taxes appears to have at least three undesirable affects:  it increases the complexity  of tax
regulation with which firms must comply, hence the possibility for discretion and corruption in
enforcement; it diminishes the relationship between firm income or profit and revenues, increasing
regressiveness among formal firms; and it has shifted the timing of tax payments to turn the gov-
emment's short-term financing problems into firms' working capital problem -- by requiring them to
pay tax on income before it is earned.  Therefore, simplification  and rationalization of the tax system
with fewer discretionary categories of tax status appears an important priority in promoting PSD.
39VI. LABOR  MARKETS.  REGULATION  AND PSD
In spite of a seemingly  strangling  regulatory  environment  for employment  and relatively  high
levels  of worker  compensation,  entrepreneurs  operating  in CMte  d'Ivoire  do not consider  labor  as one
of their major constraints. The reason -- in addition  to simply  indicating  that there are worse
constraints  -- appears  to be that they  are finding  legal (or,  at least,  non-prosecutable)  means  to attain
flexibility  and reduce labor costs.  Hence, labor does not appear to be a binding  constraint  on
enterprises  operating  in the formal  sector,  because  the division  between  formality  and informality  is
blurred  in yet another dimension.
Segments  and Linkages In a sense,  there are three urban  labor markets: the government,
the formal  private  sector, and the informal  sector. However,  the links between  these markets  are
stronger  than is commonly  represented  and the distinctions  between  them smaller. In recent years,
informal  employment  has grown  rapidly,  while  formal  employment  in the private  sector has declined.
While the  informal sector is notoriously  difficult to  measure quantitatively,  official statistics
acknowledge  urban informal  sector  employment  to be more than three times  that of formal  sector
employment.
Table 9:  Employment  Statistics  and Estimates
(in 000's and annual  % change  over five  year intervals)
1980  %change  1985  Z change  1990 est.
Agricultural  Sector  3,125  2.1  3,460  2.5  3,900
Modern  Sector  470  -3.0  405  -1.0  385
Informal  Sector  719  5.0  910  5.7  1,200
Total  Labor  Force  4,314  |  2.1  [4.m  2.8  6,335
Source:  Direction  de L'Efnploi,  Ministere  du Travail
Government  has traditionally  provided  the principal  source  of formal  sector employment  for
Ivoirian  graduates  with a higher education. It established  a generous  level of compensation  that
appears to have shaped general expectations  of skilled  workers  about the standard  of living  they
deserve.' In spite of two  pay freezes  in the 1980's,  public  sector  salaries  average  10.3  times  the per
capita  GDP, even before adding  in generous  benefits  and access  to informal  sources  of income. 5"
I  Several entrepreneurs criticized  the educational  system  for excessively  orienting students
towards being becoming  civil  servants,  rather than business  people.  As a result, until recently,
business  was regarded  as an occupation  second  to government  service  or teaching.
S1  This high average apparently  masks  substantial  differences  between positions. Notably,
teachers  have much  higher than average  salaries.
40The formal private sector appears to be comprised of two distinct sub-markets: that of large-
scale and particularly foreign-owned  enterprises, which is subject to the full force of regulatory law,
and  that  of  other  enterprises (particularly Ivoirian-owned), which, while observing most or  all
government regulations, suffers from fewer direct enforcement activities by government officials. In
the first category, regulations appear to sharply restrict performance-based incentives, hiring and
firing, and compensation policy. For firms in the second category, there appears to be a degree of
regulatory tolerance.
The economic crisis has led formal sector firms increasingly  to find ways  to reduce labor costs
and expand their employment flexibidty. Those attempting to stay within the law have resorted to
three principal methods: greater use of day-labor as opposed to salaried labor; the expanded practice
of apprenticeship; and subcontracting  with informal-sector  firms or individuals. The economic crisis
has, thus, strengthened the links between formal and informal sectors, making an understanding of
the dynamics  of this relationship far more important.  This relationship has improved the ability of
the formal sector to adjust to economic stagnation by increasing its flexibility  and reducing costs.
Greater flexibility  in employment and labor costs is a key characteristic denoting informality.
Wages for full time employees in the informal sector are often equivalent to or better  than the
mandatory minimum  wage (SMIG), although compensation usually lacks the substantial non-wage
benefits associated with formal employment. Compensation in the informal sector is more commonly
structured to promote productivity,  often taking the form of a piece-work or commission  basis. At
the microenterprise level, business can serve as a form of self and family employment and is often
ambulant or home-based. For self-employed  entrepreneurs, their family members, their apprentices
and their casual employees, wages depend largely on business, and can fall substantially  below the
SMIG.
Formal Sector Hiring: A Government agency,  IMOCL technically  still had the monopoly  over
labor supply intermediation at the time of our study' 2:  all hiring was supposed to take place through
it.  In practice, IMOCI seemed to consider itself mainly responsible for promoting the hiring of
Ivoirians, and regulating the hiring of non-Ivoirians. Nevertheless, IMOCI still had the legal power
of forcing employers to hire exclusively  through it.  In the past this resulted in a stream of often
unqualified (but often well-connected)  candidates sent by IMOCI. This granted IMOCI considerable
arbitrary power in employment decisions,  enhancing the potential for patronage and the uncertainty
which  formal enterprises (particularly  foreign-owned  ones) face. Consistently,  Ivoirian-run  enterprises
with predominantly Ivoirian labor forces had few  complaints about IMOCL They were able to recruit
their own workers and found their subsequent registration a relatively simple formality. Even firms
with expatriate managers found few difficulties  in hiring Ivoirians of their choosing, once they had
found them through their own search processes.
Formal Sector Firing: Firing a worker for poor performance is particularly difficult in Cote
dlIvoire.  Some managers found  themselves running afoul of  the  Labor Ministry,  even  after
52  IMOCI has since been abolished.
41complying  with  legally  mandated  warning  procedures  and  even  with  evidence  of rampant  absenteeism
or blatant thievery. The most frequent outcome  of employee  appeals  to the Labor Ministty  was a
requirement  for an exorbitant  severance  payment. Again,  the amount  of the payment  appeared  to
be largely at the discretion  of department officials,  hence a source of substantial  rent-seeking
behavior.'
However,  the economic  crisis  gave  rise to a practice  that appears  to encounter no sigpificant
regulatory  obstacles: general "compressioni  of a firm's  labor force. While singling  out individual
workers  for firing led to state intervention,  entrepreneurs  registered  few complaints  about their
freedom  reducing  drastically  their overall  labor  force  when faced  with  declining  sales. A general  rule
appears  to require  respect  for seniority  in firing,  although  it is unclear  whether this  is fully  enforced.
An additional  option is technical  unemployment  (temporary  layoffs),  which  allows  a firm  to suspend
its workers  without  pay  for up to 90 days  in response  to financial  hardship.  One potential  inflexibility
of compression  laws is the  apparent need for enterprises to  close whole facilities to justify
compression,  rather than having  the flexibility  to incrementally  reduce  their workforce.'
Costs of Formal  Emploment:  Surprisingly,  the great majority  of managers  of large and
medium  formal  enterprises found the SMIG acceptable  at current levels. Whfle  complaining  of
generally  elevated factor costs, entrepreneurs  found the taxes and regulations  applying  to labor,
estimated  at between 30 to 50% of labor costs, to be more objectionable  (and sympathized  with
workers' need for a living  wage  in the face of the high urban cost of living). Ihese regulations
include  generous  vacation,  leave,  transportation  and housing  benefits.  Probably  the most pernicious
effect  on competitiveness,  in connection  with labor  costs,  results  from  the combination  of generous
mandatory  provisions  for non-monetary  compensation55  and regulatory  or administrative  obstacles
to  firing individual  workers - which lead to  uncontrollable  absenteeism,  and engender low
productivity.
Apprenticeship Particularly  interesting  and telling  is the tendency  of moderate,  small  and
micro-enterprises  to legaly  evade the SMIG  and other labor  regulations  through  the expanded  use
of apprenticeships.  Apprenticeships  have  traditionally  served  as a form of vocational  education: in
5 Several  respondents  had stories  about  extortionate  responses  of public  officials  to their firing
workers  for absenteeism,  theft, or poor performance.
I.  According  to a sectoral  expert on labor  and competitiveness  policies,  the evident difference
between  the ease  of collective  suspension  and difficulty  of results  less  from the formal  law  than from
its implementation.  He additionally  suggested  that difficulties  in firing  may be compounded  by
arbitration  processes.
"  'Fringe benefits"  such as bereavement  leave  are rooted in tradition  and cultural  practice,  but
the present  system  allows  workers  to ignore  the costs  imposed  by  their absences  and facilitates  abuse.
42skilled  crafts apprentices  sometimes  have to pay for their training,  while in other fields  they are
generally  given  little more than pocket money.' 6
The economic  crisis  of the 1980s  appears to be have significantly  expanded  the role of
apprenticeship.  Faced with tight margins  (or losses)  and an excess  supply  of labor, employers  are
both extending  the duration  and  increasing  the number  of apprenticeships.  Thus,  it is not uncommon
to find workers  in businesses  with relatively  simple  skill  requirements  'apprenticing'  for five  years.
Another  indication  of the expanded  role of apprenticeship  is provided  by the terms  of employment:
the low level of compensation  appears to reflect the wage an unregulated  market might set for
untrained  workers. Clearly,  there is a potential  for exploitation  in the use of minimally  compensated
apprentices,  but there is also an avenue  for expanding  employment  and reducing  costs beyond  that
allowed  by labor regulations  governing  regular  employees.
Official  statistics  (which  do not include  the informal  sector)  suggest  an increase  of over 200%
in apprenticeships  from 1984  to 1 9 89 .57  A 1985  government  study  of the informal  sector' found
that 21% of employees  in firms  surveyed  were apprentices,  while an additional  6% were "family
aides". Apprenticeship  was most  common  in skilled  crafts,  namely  wood  and woodwork,  where  they
comprised  60% of the labor force  (aside  from the entrepreneur);  metals,  mechanics,  and electricity,
where  they  comprised  nearly  62%  of the labor  force;  and textiles  and  clothing,  where  they  comprised
over 45% of the labor force.  There were virtually  no apprentices  found in unskdlled  or non-craft
fields  such  as commerce,  transport,  and  teaching.  The study  found  that the average  age  of apprentices
to be 20, the youngest  of any category  of workers,  indicating  that apprenticeship  is a transitional
status for younger  workers,  as well  as a substitute  for vocational  education.  The CECPS  survey
suggests  that apprenticeship  is also concentrated  in smaller  enterprses, although  not only informal
microenterprises.  While  apprentices  accounted  for less  than 1% of the corporate  labor force,  they
accounted for over 20% of  the  ULLE labor force, and about 40% of  the workers at sole
proprietorships  and unregistered  enterprises.
Subcontracting  With the government  treasury  in deficit  and many  formal  businesses  facing
many  consecutive  years  of losses,  the formal  sector  desperately  searches  for ways  of reducing  the cost
of producing  and delivering  goods and services. One method employed  increasingly  by public  and
private  enterprises,  as well  as government  agencies,  is the use of subcontracting  with informal  sector
s6. According  to one World  Bank  official,  apprenticeship  in law is not nearly  so flexible  as it is
in practice. In this view,  apprenticeship  is formally  subject  to legal  constraints  and obligations  not
reported by the firms  we interviewed.
I  According  to IMOCI  figures,  apprenticeships  rose from 4% of work  contracts  in 1984  to 24%
of contracts  in 1989. Even with the number  of new  contracts  declining  by 40%, the actual  increase
numbers  of apprenticeship  contracts  more than trebled. Annuaire  Statistigue  du Travail.  1989
S8 Ministeres  de l'Education  Nationale,  de l'Economie,  du Travail,  et de l'Industrie. Le Secteur
Informel  Urbain.  1985: Princigaux  Rdsultats
43VII. CONCLUSIONS
Cote d'Ivoire's private  sector entered the 1990s  a colossus  with feet of clay  once thriving
enterprises  were deeply  mired in an economic  crisis  accentuated  by policy  and regulatory  rigidities,
and encumbered  by a weighty  public  sector. Significant  parts of the private  sector are most likely
facing  a bottomless  downturn. Yet, there appears to be considerable  untapped potential in the
indigenous  private sector:  ranging from manufacturing  small and microenterprises  with some
technical  skills,  but little business  know-how;  to medium  and large enterprises  straight-jacketed  by
taxes, regulation,  the uncompetitive  relationship  between  domestic  and foreign  price 61, and policy
uncertainties.
Much of the solution  will depend on remedies  previously  prescribed  in World Bank and
Government documents following  analyses of  external and  intemal  competitiveness,  public
expenditure,  and the financial  system.  The prescribed  reforms  are crucial  prerequisites  in the absence
of which  the pursuit of private  sector development  will  be futile. It is important  to note, however,
that unless  overarching  economic  distortions  are removed,  entrepreneurs  may  well  focus  their  ingenu-
ity  on the wrong  activities  from a perspective  of international  competitiveness  and  long-term  growth.
To fulhy  realize  the benefits of the already  initiated  adjustment  process  it will also be necessary  to
foster competition  throughout  the economy  - stimulating  entry and growth  at all levels  of private
enterprise,  to enhance  the security  of property  rights,  and to raise the standards  of public  service.
This report has sought to provide  an analysis  of issues  relating to the nexus  of public  and
private  sectors,  drawing  heavily  on the perceptions  of entrepreneurs  themselves.  It is intended  to
complement  the existing  body  of economic  and  sector  work  on C6te  d7Ivoire  (notably  the recent  work
on financial  sector issues  and public  expenditure,  and the extensive  work underway  for the Industry
and Competitiveness  Review). The next step should be to develop a private  sector development
strategy  for Cote dlIvoire  that would: (i) articulate  macro-  and microeconomic  policy  reforms; (ii)
identify  binding  constraints  to private  enterprise  operation  and growth;  and (iii)  assign  priorities  and
sequence interventions  to alleviate those constraints. The analysis  in this report suggests  the
following  elements  should  be included  in such a strategy.
Taxes  The tax system  needs  an overhaul,  both to reduce  its impractical  regulatory  burden,
and eliminate  powerful  disincentives  that result from efforts to increase  revenue extraction
from a shrinking  tax base. In particular.
* Marginal  tax rates on enterprises,  imports  and formal  sector labor are clearly  in
excess  of either efficiency.  or revenue-maximizing  optima. They must  be reduced  in
order to halt further  erosion  of the tax base.
The pervasive  impact  of the real exchange  rate and of the compensatory  measures  it has
required cannot be overemphasized. It  is an indication  of the uncertainty-shy,  inward-looking,
protected nature of large segments  of the private sector in Cote d'Ivoire that only a very small
minority  of the entrepreneurs  interviewed  could  be counted as advocates  of change.
45firms. Subcontracting  offers three potential advantages to large firms: it reduces fixed  costs, allowing
them to contract  for labor as demand arises (especially important in  a slack and  unpredictable
economy); it facilitates the use of productivity-based  payment schemes; and it allows firms to evade
sometimes strangling costs of regulation and taxation' 9 through subcontracts with lower-visibility
informal firms. For example, one textile firm that experienced a dramatic decline in sales in recent
years had substantially reduced its labor force. Increasingly,  it subcontracted with informal firms on
a  piece-work basis to  manufacture its  products.  Many of  the  microenterprises with  which it
subcontracted were former employees working in their homes, some of whom made the equivalent
of their former salaries, thanks to high productivity.
While the government cannot directly deal with firms not fully complying  with its tax and
regulatory requirements, it can do so indirectly. In public works, for example, large, formal-sector
firms are able to  reduce their bids by subcontracting major parts of their construction work to
informal firms.  Subcontracting is common practice among the firms contracting with them for road
and building construction.  While, legally,  government contractors are liable for the evaded taxes of
their subcontractors, enforcement is sufficiently  lax that they are commonly willing  to take the risk.
In the restrictive regulatory environment of Cote d'Ivoire, subcontracting adds badly needed
flexibility  and efficiency to some industries in heavily constrained private labor markets. Depending
on the  elasticity of demand for labor, it may well have contributed significantly to  maintaining
employment beyond what it might otherwise have been during the present economic crisis. It is, thus,
important  during  the  transition  for  the  Government  to  refrain  from  pursuing full regulatory
enforcement by small subcontractors. Nonetheless, subcontracting poses the danger of removing all
worker protection and now plays the role of a short-term response to excessive  regulation. It would
not be necessary (as an evasion) if regulatory rigidities  were relaxed.' 0
59 Clearly, salary is only one part of labor costs, about 60% for most formal sector firms. The
rest of the cost is iu payroll taxes, leave benefits, and a variety of other worker entitlements under
the law.
'0. Clearly, even entirely legal subcontracting  would offer advantages in flexbility of use of labor
(reduced fixed costs) and avoidance of labor regulations applying only to firms above a threshhold
number of workers.
44*  "Rebatable"  withholding  taxes are depriving  financially  starved  firms  of working
capital  and not being  rebated. Most should  be eliminated.
* Given  that the government  is unable to protect the FNR from appropriation  and
that its administration  has proven  discriminatory  against  small  enterprise,  it should  be
eliminated  in favor of a sufficient  increase in the corporate profits tax to  meet
government's  revenue  needs.
* Discretion  in tax and tariff  rates appears  to increase  the regulatory  burden  and the
incidence  of rent-seeking.  The number  of categories  of rates should  be reduced  (or
rates  unified)  and regulations  simplified  to eliminate  exemptions  and  other sources  of
discretion.
* Reports of enormous  leakage  between tax collections  from small  businesses  and
revenues  reaching  the Treasury  suggest  a need for investigation  and reform. Below
a certain  size and turnover,  enterprises  should  be exempted  from tax.
Public Expenditure Within  the macro-picture  of excessive  public  expenditure,  there are a
number  of opportunities  for the state to improve  the impact  (or reduce the burden) of its
spending  on PSD and to create more productive  linkages  with the private  sector.
*  Relatively  high public  sector wages  are destructive  to PSD not only because  of
their large  draw  on public  finance  but also because  of their tendency  to crowd  skilled
workers  out of private markets  with the offer of high wage,  high status positions,
many  of which  contribute  little  to the economy.  Thus, in spite  of the difficult  political
path the must  be tread to accomplish  it, the government  must  reduce  the salaries  and
benefits  of many  higher-level  officials  and end its policy  of guaranteed  employment
for graduates  of higher  education.
* The role of public  enterprises and parastatals  (including  'strategic"  ones) in the
economy  appears  excessive,  both in their use of social  resources  and their power  to
rule out competition.  Government  should  work  to encourage  greater competition  in
sectors ruled by  public enterprises, increasing their linkages to  private firms,
contracting  out more of their functions,  and removing  their regulatory  power.  The
experience of SODECI and CIE shows the potentially  huge efficiency  gains of
introducing  private components into the  management  and operation of public
monopolies,  emphasizing  their potential  for activities  the Government  is  unwilling  to
privatize. Additional  gains may  be achieved  through reducing  vertical integration,
hardening budget constraints  and exposing  public enterprises and parastatals to
competitive  market  forces. Ultimately,  these  gains  can  best be achieved  and sustained
through  private  ownership  and competitive  markets  in fields  traditionally  controlled
by state-sponsored  monopolies.
46* Government expenditure on education and health has been skewed towards the
elite, those most able to self-finance provision.  At the same time, the country has
underinvested in facilities and  supplies with the greatest social and distributional
benefits (as weli as the greatest potential impact on PSD):  those for primary and
secondary education and primary health care.  Thus, allocation should be improved.
Furthermore,  the  educational  system should eliminate  its  curricular biases  and
incentives against entrepreneurial careers.
* Procurement procedures have the potential to encourage PSD.  The government
should assure that its procurement policies allow any firm to compete equitably, in a
well-publicized  and uncorrupted process. In general, lot sizes do not appear too large
for small enterprises, but the government's horrendous record on payment acts as a
strong disincentive  for small private firms with limited access to working capital to do
business with the public sector.  The government should clear up  its arrears and
adhere to a rigid payment schedule spelled out in each contract.  Discretion and as-
sociated rent-seeking should be efim;nated from payment in the procurement process.
Finance Through crowding  out and political  interference, government has made credit scarce
for  ail but  the  largest, most-established enterprises.  Private banks should be  given an
appropriate, neutral  regulatory environment in which to operate; restitution of arrears to
financial institutions should  be  made  a  priority.  Given  its  past  institutional  failures,
government should remove itself as much as possible from administrative  allocation of credit.
Labor Regulation  Labor  regulation  has  introduced  burdensome  rigidities that  have
contnbuted  to the need for evasions of formal law through subcontracting, apprenticeship,
and outright illegality. In spite of the fact that businesses  do not perceive labor regulations
as a leading obstacle, ultimately,  more reasonable regulations would extend the government's
mantle of protection (and  revenue base) to a broader group of workers and enterprises.
Labor regulatory reform should focus, less on the minimum  wage (which few find a burden)
and more on other benefits that limit the reliability of labor (e.g. leave policies), restrict
performance incentives, and constrain firing for dereliction.  Apprenticeships appear to
provide valuable vocational training while also offering employment to workers possessing
little human capital.  One  proposal before the  Ivoirians is a "training wage" that  offers
enterprises a formal option to pay inexperienced individuals  less than the SMIG. Past public
administrative failure cautions us, however, that such a mechanism is no substitute for the
current laissez-fair acceptance of apprenticeships (within reasonable limits). If adoption of
a  "training wage" extends bureaucratic rigidities and discretion to  apprenticeships, it may
actually inhibit this valuable source of training.
Education,  Training and Technical Assistance  Arguments for reducing the state's negative
role do not diminish its potential positive role in supporting entrepreneurship through various
services:
47* The taxonomy  of business  ,evealed that education  was highly  correlated  with
formality  - a  state of full ccrporate citizenship,  bearing full responsibility  for
obligations  to the state and benefiting  from access to bank financing  and formal
channels  of technical  assistance.  This  suggests  that investment  in education  (at least
up to  the secondary  level) and elimination  of anti-entrepreneurial  biases in the
curriculum  may  encourage  expansion  of the formal  SME  sector.
* However,  as current technical  assistance  is reaching  primarily  the educated,  there
is a need to look for innovative  intermediate-term  approaches  to technical  assistance
oriented  towards  the least  privileged,  educated  and influential  entrepreneurs.  Models
pioneered  by several  NGOs for microenterprise  assistance,  using  credit  conditioned
on technical  assistance  and training  to entrepreneurs,  might  prove  useful  in extending
the reach of support  programs  to micro-  and small  enterprises.
* Finally,  technical  and financial  assistance  are bound  to be required (at least  during
a transition  period) for a diverse,  dynamic  SME sector to emerge and grow. The
experience  of APDF  suggests  that entrepreneurs  with medium-to-large  projects  exist
and  would  likely  materialize  in force  in response  to an improved  business  environment
- possibly  with  some  (cost-effective)  assistance  to link  up  with  financiers  and  partners.
the vast  potential  of the SME  sector (including  migrants  from  a belt-tightening  public
sector)  will,  in particular,  require  assistance  to get started. Promising  models  which
involve  a combination  of business  services,  equity  participation,  and  loan  financing  are
being  experimented  with  by  NGOs,  cooperative  associations,  and  for-profit  promoters.
These  models  have in common  a triangular  arrangement  in which  the would-be  (or
expanding)  entrepreneur  obtains  term financing  from a bank, partly  on the basis  of
an agreement  with a provider  of technical  assistance  who also takes a stake in the
venture (in the form  of either equity  or guarantees). Variations  of this model  appear
weli worth developing  to support the emergence  and growth  of both SMEs and
productive  microenterprises.
Legal  System There is a need for streamlined,  expedient  mechanisms  for conflict  resolution
(including  effective  recourse  against  government  decisions).  Courts  and  court  officials  require
incentives  and  safeguards  against  corruptibility.  Private  businesses  supplying  the government
should have neutral courses of appeal should problems  arise during the course of the
contract.  Other measures  are needed to reduce transaction  costs and generate business
confidence.
Other Support Services Existing  policies  have turned productive  energies  inward  towards
domestic  markets. Expansion  of export  horizons  for manufactures  (beyond  the francophone
world)  may  now  require approaches  with limited  public  institutional  inputs  and a high level
of private  sector participation,  such as partial finaneing  of market exploration  expeditions.
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